Free Trade, Fair Trade, Green Trade: Defogging the Debate by Charnovitz, Steve
Cornell International Law Journal
Volume 27
Issue 3 Symposium 1994 Article 2
Free Trade, Fair Trade, Green Trade: Defogging the
Debate
Steve Charnovitz
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cornell
International Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please contact
jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation




Free Trade, Fair Trade, Green Trade:
Defogging the Debate
Introduction .................................................... 459
I. Overview of the Main Issues .............................. 462
A. Environmental Effects of Trade ....................... 462
B. The New Critique .................................... 463
C. Matters of Inquiry .................................... 465
D. The GAIT and Environmental Supervision ............ 467
I. Defogging the Debate .................................... 471
A. Free Trade and Environmental Policy ................. 471
B. Trade Policy and Environmental Policy ................ 472
C. Openness ............................................ 474
D. Discrimination ....................................... 476
E. Balancing ............................................ 477
F. Science and Values ................................... 487
G. Eco-Imperialism ...................................... 492
H. Unilateralism ........................................ 493
I. Border Tax Adjustments .............................. 498
J. Polluter-Pays Principle ................................ 505
M . National Policies ......................................... 513
A. European Commission ............................... 513
B. The Reagan and Bush Administrations ................ 515
C. The Clinton Administration .......................... 518
Conclusion ...................................................... 524
Introduction
During the past few years the interaction between international trade and
the environment has received attention in the GATr, 1 in parliaments, 2 in
* Policy Director, Competitiveness Policy Council, Washington, D.C. M.P.P.,
Harvard University, 1983; BA., Yale University, 1975. The views expressed are those of
the author only.
1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATr), opened for signature Oct. 30,
1947, 61 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 188, rprinted in GATT, BAsIc INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED
DOCUMENTS [hereinafter B.I.S.D.], 4th Supp. 1 (1969) [hereinafter GATT]. The term
GATT may be used to refer both to the General Agreement and to the overseeing and
administering organization based in Geneva, Switzerland. For a summary of GATr dis-
cussions on the issue of international trade and the environment, see TRADE & ENV'T
(GATT, Geneva, Switz.) (a bimonthly newsletter printed in green ink).
2. Both the U.S. and European legislatures have addressed the issue. See High
Seas Driftnet Fisheries Enforcement Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-582 § 203, 106 Stat.
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the press,3 in new books,4 in policy conferences, 5 on the Internet,6 and in
rap music.7 It has been considered by the G-7,8 the United Nations Con-
ference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 9 the World Bank,' 0 the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD),"
the GATT Council and Secretariat, 12 the U.N. Conference on Environ-
ment and Development,' 3 the Sistema Econ6mico Latinoamericano
(SELA), 14 and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).1 5
4900, 4905-06 (1992) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1826a (Supp. IV 1992)). As
to the European Parliament, see Report of the Committee on External Economic Relations on
Environment and Trade EuR. PARI.. Doc. (A3-0329/92) (1992).
3. See GA7Te7q v Greeney, ECONOMIST, May 30, 1992, at 54. Starting in 1994, BNA's
International Trade Reporter has added the environment to its weekly topical index.
See 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) (Jan. 12, 1994).
4. See THE GREENING OF WORLD TRADE ISSUES (Kym Anderson & Richard
Blackhurst eds., 1992); TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT (Durwood Zaelke et al. eds.,
1993); DANIEL C. ESTY, INSTITUTE FOR INT'L ECONOMICS, GREENING THE GAT: TRADE,
ENVIRONMENT, AND THE FUTURE (1994); C. FORD RUNGE, FREER TRADE, PROCTCtED ENvi-
RONMENT: BALANCING TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL INTERESTS (1994);
DAVID VOGEL, GLOBALIZING REGULATION: ENVIRONMENT AND CONSUMER PROTECTION
AND TRADE POLICY (forthcoming Aug. 1995); TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT: THE
SEARCH FOR BALANCE (James Cameron et al. eds., 1994).
5. See INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT, WORLD BANK DISCUSSION
PAPERS 159 (Patrick Low ed., 1992); ORG. FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEV.
(OECD), ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND INDUSTRIAL COMPETITIVENESS (1993); INTERNA.
TIONAL TRADE, INVESTMENT AND ENVIRONMENT: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1993 FENNER CON-
FERENCE ON THE ENVIRONMENT (Ralf Buckley & Clyde Wild eds., Australian Academy of
Science 1994).
6. See, e.g., Internet, Trade.strategy and trade.library in conf.iatp.igc.apc.
7. ECOROPA/AIm-GATT CAMPAIGN, DROP THE GATT (Anti-GATT Campaign)
(on file with the Cornell International Law Journal).
8. 27 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc, 968, 969 (July 17, 1991). "G-7" is shorthand for
the governments of the seven major industrial democracies of the world.
9. A New Partnership for Development: The Cartagena Commitment U.N. Conference
on Trade and Development, 8th Sess., U.N. Doc. TD(VIII)/Misc. 4 (1992) [hereinafter
The Cartagena Commitment].
10. See THE WORLD BANK, WoRi? DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1992: DEVELOPMENT AND
THE ENVIRONMENT 67 (1992).
11. See OECD Trade and Environmrnt Guidelines, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, June 11, 1993, at
18; see also Ebba Dohlman, The Trade Effects of Environmental Regulation, OECD
OBSERVER, Feb./Mar. 1990, at 28.
12. GATT SECRETARIAT, 1 INTERNATIONAL TRADE 90-91 19-39 (1992).
13. See Agenda 21, U.N. Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED),
secs. 2.22, 11.24, 17.118, 39.3(d), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (1992) [hereinaf-
ter Agenda 21].
14. See SELA PERMANENT SECRETARIAT, THE NEw TRADE ISSUES: COMPETITION POL-
icY, TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT (1992).
15. ROBERT REP-rro, TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (UNEP Environment
and Trade Series No. 1, 1994); DAVID HUNTER Er AL., CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATION. ENVIRONMENTAL LAw. AN INTRODUCTION (UNEP Environment and
Trade Series No. 2, 1994); ROBERT HOUSMN, RECONCILING TRADE AND THE ENVIRON-
mENTr. LESSONS FROM THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (UNEP Environ-
ment and Trade Series No. 3, 1994); WILLIAM LESSER, INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS
SUPPORTING TRADE IN GENETIC MATERIALS: ISSUES UNDER THa BIODIVERSry CONVENTION
AND GAIT/TRIPs (UNEP Environment and Trade Series No. 4, 1994);JOHN M. STONE.
HOUSE &JOHN D. MUMFORD, SCIENCE, RISK ANALYSIS AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY DECI-
SIONS (UNEP Environment and Trade Series No. 5, 1994).
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Despite this constructive discussion, little progress has been made toward
reaching an international consensus on solutions. For that matter, no
consensus exists on identifying the problems.
The issue of trade and environment is not really a new one. As one
keen analyst of trade policy explained in 1973:
Environmental issues affect the world economy through the movement of
polluted products in international trade, the differences in national rules
governing (or ignoring) the pollution content of production processes, and
activities of industrial countries which affect other countries through alter-
ing the environment itself. All three aspects could prove important to inter-
national economic relations.
16
These three aspects remain important, but it was probably the advent of a
fourth aspect-the burgeoning supervisory role of trade agreements-that
triggered new interest in the topic and all of its ramifications.
The new interest in the topic may lead to the resolution of tensions
between trade and the environment. The GATT has recently embarked
on a new work program on the environment which was approved at the
Marrakesh Ministerial in April 1 9 9 4 .17 When U.S. President Bill Clinton
signed the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 18 imple-
menting legislation, he stated: "Our agenda must, therefore, be far reach-
ing. We are determining that dynamic trade cannot lead to
environmental despoliation. We will seek new institutional arrangements
to ensure that trade leaves the world cleaner than before."19 Clinton's
agenda is far reaching. It would be hard enough to assure that trade does
not make the world less clean, but actually assigning trade a cleansing
function is an ambitious goal indeed.
20
Part I of this article lays out the main issues from environmental and
trade perspectives. Part II focuses on several specific topics that have been
the source of much confusion in the debate. Part III discusses the trade
and environmental policies of the E.U. and the United States. Part IV
presents some conclusions.
16. C. FRED BERSTEN, THE FUTURE or THE INTERNATIONAL EcoNoMIc ORDER: AN
AGENDA FOR RESEARCH 42 (1973).
17. See [Trade Negotiating Committee) Decision on Trade and Environment, GATT Doc.
MTN.TNC/W/141 (Mar. 29, 1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1267 (1994), INSME U.S.
TRADE, Apr. 8, 1994, at 5-4.
18. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32
I.L.M. 296 and 32 I.L.M. 605 [hereinafter NAFTA].
19. Remarks on Signing the North American Free Trade Agreement Implementa-
tion Act, 29 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 2547, 2550 (Dec. 8, 1993). On signing the
NAFTA supplemental agreements, Clinton said that his Administration had "put the
environment at the center of this in [sic] future agreements." See 29 WEEKLY COMP.
PREs. Doc. 1758 (Sept. 14, 1993).
20. The Clinton Administration suggests that trade already does this to some
extent. A brochure designed to sell the Uruguay Round to the public states that "by
fostering greater efficiency and higher productivity, increased trade can actually reduce
pollution by encouraging the growth of less polluting industries and the adoption and
diffusion of cleaner technologies." See OFFcE OF THE U.S. TADE REPRESENTATIVE, URU-
GUAY ROUND: JOBS FOR THE UNrrED STATES, GRO'rH FOR THE WORLD 9 (1994).
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I. Overview of the Main Issues
Anyone studying the linkages between the environment and trade must
consider two very complex issues: (1) the impact of trade on the environ-
ment and (2) the impact of GATT rules on the environment. Part I will
deal with these issues on a conceptual, rather than empirical, level.
A. Environmental Effects of Trade
International trade is the exchange of ownership and the relocation of a
good across a border. The exchange is motivated by a payment or by a
barter. The relocation of the good could have environmental effects,
although the payment probably has none.
One direct environmental impact of trade involves the transportation
of goods. For example, the energy consumed, preservatives used, the port
polluted, and the possibility of some hazardous spill are all potentially
adverse environmental effects of transportation. The relocation of a good
can also have a direct environmental impact. For example, imported fruit
may allow a potentially hazardous animal to enter a country.2 ' Hazardous
waste may be transferred to a country that does not dispose of it prop-
erly.22 Of course, not all locational effects are negative. Trade in environ-
mental technology may eventuate cleaner production.
23
Trade may also involve economic changes that have indirect conse-
quences for the environment or human health. 24 These consequences
can impact production or disposal of goods and materials. (In some cases,
they are "externalities," but they can also be "internalities.") 25 Many of
the consequences would happen anyway as a result of domestic produc-
tion. For example, the purchase of an imported car will lead to the burn-
ing of fossil fuels and will cause some auto pollution. But it is
inappropriate to attribute these effects to international trade if autos
would have otherwise been produced by domestic companies. Thus, if
one is to analyze the indirect effects of trade, one must look for effects that
would not have occurred from domestic production and commerce.
There are two main types of indirect effects-scale and structural.
26
Scale effects result from the higher level of economic activity induced by
trade. In other words, trade can accelerate the existing trends of produc-
21. For a discussion of the zebra mussel problem, see John Ross, An Aquatic Invader
is Running Amok in U.S. Waterways, 24 SMrrHSONAN 41 (1994).
22. Daly discusses several reasons why toxins should not be exported. See Herman
Daly & Robert Goodland, An Ecological-Economic Assessment of Deregulation of International
Commerce Under GATT, ECOLOGICAL ECON., Jan. 1994, at 73, 80-81.
23. See generally OFFicE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, INDUSTRY,
TECHNOLOGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT: COMPETITIVE CHALLENGES AND BusINEss OPPORTU-
NITES (1994).
24. See generally OECD, THE ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF TRADE (1994).
25. An externality occurs when there are social benefits or costs that are not consid-
ered when private individuals in a transaction assess their individual benefits or costs.
An internality occurs when private individuals do not assess their individual benefits or
costs in a rational way, perhaps because of inadequate information.
26. See Candice Stevens, The EnvironmentalEffects of Trade, 16 WORLD ECON. 439, 444-
45 (1993).
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tion.2 7 For example, the increased air pollution in Mexico is a scale effect
of NAFTA. Structural effects on the other hand result from changes in the
patterns of production.2 8 In other words, trade can engender production
that might not otherwise exist. For example, without the possibility of
exporting ivory, less harvesting of African elephants would occur.
In summary, the direct effects of trade involve transportation and
location. The indirect effects concern the scale and the structure of the
economy. The effects of trade liberalization (or trade restrictions) can
also be analyzed in these four categories: scale, structure, direct, and indi-
rect effects.
B. The New Critique
Criticism over the effects of trade and trade liberalization on environmen-
tal quality has grown over the past few years. For example, Ravi Batra has
written that "[i]nternational trade comes out as the worst villain in the
destruction of the environment. It is the most diabolical polluter in the
world and offers a precious lesson in the desirability of economic diversifi-
cation versus specialization." 29 Tim Lang and Colin Hines have written
that "trade brings more of the problems the world needs less of: threats to
the environment, uneven spread of employment, and widening gaps
between rich and poor, both within societies and between societies."30 Jay
Hair has stated, "In short, the current status of what is widely known as
free trade, i.e. the 'free' and unregulated movement of goods and services
around the globe, is an unacceptable status quo."
3 1
When firms compete for trade, those that use cleaner and healthier
manufacturing techniques may put themselves at a competitive disadvan-
tage.3 2 National environmental regulations establish a "level playing field"
within a country. Yet very little international regulation exists. As Herman
E. Daly explains:
Economists rightly urge nations to follow a domestic program of internal-
izing costs into prices. They also wrongly urge nations to trade freely with
27. The GATT Secretariat uses the term "magnifier" to describe the scale effects of
trade. See GATT SECarETARAT, supra note 12. But while trade magnifies, it may also
mask. See Sandra Postel, Canrying Capacity: Earth's Bottom Line, in STATE OF THE WORLD
16-19 (Lester R. Brown ed., 1994).
28. For an example of a structural effect with adverse environmental consequences
resulting from the Uruguay Round agriculture agreement, see Jean Anne Casey & Col-
leen Hobbs, Look What the GATT Dragged In, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1994, at A17.
29. RAvE BATRA, THE MYTr OF FREE TRADE: A PLAN FOR AMERICA's ECONOMIC RMVs-
VAL 226 (1993). Batra is a professor of economics at Southern Methodist University.
30. TIM LANG & COLIN HImEs, THE NEW PROTECTIONIsM 3 (1993).
31. Trade and Environmental Issues: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Commerce
and Tourism of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994), available in
LEXIS, News Library, Script File (statement ofJay D. Hair, President, National Wildlife
Federation).
32. COMMISSION ON INT'L TRADE AND INV. PoLIcY (WILLIAMS COMM'N), UNITED
STATES INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WoR. 130-39 (1971).
For an earlier discussion of the same problem in labor regulation, see MANLEY 0. HuD-
SON, PROGRESS IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 50 (1932).
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other countries that do not internalize their costs (and consequently have
lower prices). If a nation tries to follow both those policies, the conflict is
clear: free competition between different cost-internalizing regimes is
utterly unfair.
33
Furthermore, trade may entice governments to lower environmental stan-
dards (or taxes), or to refrain from raising them, in the presence of less-
regulated foreign competition.3 4 To deal with this pressure, many com-
mentators suggest the use of trade restrictions. For example, Frances
Cairncross writes that "[f] ree-traders will fret. Yet green trade barriers may
have a logic of their own. They may be the only way that one country can
put real pressure on another to make sure its companies shoulder the
costs they would otherwise impose on the environment."3 5
Another concern about trade relates to the paradigm of "sustainable
development."3 6 According to Daly, "[s]ustainable development means
living within environmental constraints of absorptive and regenerative
capacities .... Trade between nations or regions offers a way of loosening
local constraints by importing environmental services (including waste
absorption) from elsewhere."37 It is possible to disagree with Daly's policy
conclusions3 8 but still recognize the quandary he identifies. Simply put,
can a nation really be pursuing sustainable development if it imports envi-
ronmental services from a nation that does not follow sustainable
development?
Several responses have been made to this new critique. First, while
countries may need harmonized environmental standards on certain
global or regional issues,3 9 there are many topics of regulation that do not
have significant transborder implications. For those issues, one might
anticipate that national regulations would differ and such non-uniformity
is proper since it reflects differing national values. 40 Second, international
trade could raise product standards as producers meet market demand for
33. Herman E. Daly, Perils of Free Trade, Sci. Am., Nov. 1993, at 50, 52. It should be
noted that this fairness problem would exist even if countries had impermeable envi-
ronmental borders. The fact that borders are permeable adds an environmental
dimension to a commercial issue.
34. See Bronwen Maddox, Can Europe Compete?: Black Skies, Red Tape, Green Fields,
Grey Area, FIN. TIMEs, Mar. 3, 1994, at 11. It is interesting to note that Martin Wolf
agrees that this pressure exists but believes that it "is not generally so high as to elimi-
nate the freedom of action of governments .... " See MARTIN WOLF, THE RESISTIBLE
APPEAL OF FoRTREss EUROPE 62 (1994).
35. FRANCEs CAIRNcROSS, COSTING THE EARTH 251 (1991).
36. See the recommendations of the Roots of the Future, Global NGO Conference
concerning trade in AGENDA YA WANANCHI: CITIZENS ACTION PLAN FOR THE 1990s 25-27
(1991).
37. Herman E. Daly, From Adjustment to Sustainable Development, in THE CASE AGAINST
FREE TRADE 129 (Earth Island Press ed., 1993).
38. Daly believes that "[tuhe default position should favor domestic production for
domestic markets." See Daly, supra note 37, at 50.
39. Sometimes different states want their own environmental policies. See D'Vera
Cohn, Md., Va. May Go Separate Ways on Clean Air, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 1993, at B3.
40. For an excellent study covering both the theory and the available data, see Rich-
ard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulation and International Competitiveness, 102 YALE LJ.
2039 (1993).
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greener products. 4 1 Third, greater competition could force firms to look
for more efficient production methods, which may result in better pollu-
tion control technology. Fourth, there is also an "income effect" from eco-
nomic growth: 42 as countries become richer, citizens may demand more
environmental quality. Yet as Gene Grossman notes, "even for those
dimensions of environmental quality where growth seems to have been
associated with improving conditions, there is no reason to believe that
the process has been automatic." 43 Fifth, the relocation of production to
countries with lower environmental standards can be viewed as desirable,
not undesirable. According to Martin Wolf, "Provided barriers to trade
are small, polluting processes will move to the country with the more lib-
eral regulations. In this case, the country that has imposed the tighter reg-
ulation loses the processes its people dislikes, while still enjoying, through
trade, the products they desire."4 4 Sixth, trade and environmental policy
concerns should not be mixed.45 As the Financial Times opined: "The
environment is important. But this concern should not be allowed to pol-
lute the course of world trade. ."46
C. Matters of Inquiry
In considering how the GATr might be reformed to respond to the trade
and environment problem, it is helpful to consider the approach which
the GATr currently takes. The GATT concerns only a narrow slice of
trade issues.4 7 Imagine that Company XYZ in the United States trades a
widget to a company in Japan for $10. There are numerous questions that
might be asked about this trade. For example:
" Scale
1. Did the production of the widget harm the U.S. environment?
* Structure
2. Should Japan be self-reliant on widgets?
3. Are widgets made in the United States because of higher environ-
mental standards in Japan?
4. Is widget production sustainable in the United States; is widget
consumption sustainable in Japan?
* Location
5. Does the widget harm the health of humans or animals in Japan?
41. See When Green Is Good, ECONOMIsT, Nov. 20, 1993, at 19.
42. See GATT SECRETARIAT, suprTa note 12, at 30. For a critique of this view, see Ralf
Buckley, International Trade, Investment and Environmental Regulation, J. WORLD TRADE,
Aug. 1993, at 101, 120-21.
43. GENE M. GRossrAN, POLLUTION AND GROWTH: WHAT Do WE KNOW? (Centre for
Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper No. 848, 1993).
44. WOLF, supra note 34, at 55.
45. For example, John Block (former U.S. Secretary of Agriculture in the Reagan
Administration) said at a trade and environment conference, "I do not believe that we
need to green the GATI anymore than it is. The GATr is a trade organization." See
John Block, Reflections on the Conference Agenda, in AGRIcULTURE, THE ENVIRONMENT AND
TRADE---CONFLICr OR COOPERATION? 259 (Caroline T. Williamson ed., 1993).
46. Trade and the Environment FIN. TiMEs, Feb. 12, 1992, at 16.
47. SeeJohn Whalley, The Interface Between Environmental and Trade Policies, EcoN. J.,
March 1991, at 180, 187-88.
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6. If widget use is banned in the United States, has it notified Japan of
that fact?
* Transportation
7. Did any of the widget spill on the way?
* Pricing
8. Does the $10 include all of the externalities of widget production?
9. Does the $10 take into account the value of irreplaceable resources
consumed to produce widgets?
10. Could Japan have bought the widget for less than $10 if the
United States had adequate antitrust enforcement?
11. Does the federal or a state government subsidize the production
of the widget (including the energy used to ship it to Japan)?
12. Does XYZ "dump" the widget?
" Legal
13. Did XYZ have a legal right to sell the widget?
14. Was the widget production and sale in conformity with relevant
treaties?
15. Is the sale of widgets banned in Japan?
16. Is exportation of the widget banned in the United States?
* Other
17. Should Japan buy more widgets?
18. Does widget production harm the global commons?
19. Should the United States have retained the widget for domestic
use?
20. Does the United States undercut its national security by giving
Japan the widget?
21. Does the imported widget injure Japanese widget producers?
22. Will widget workers in Japan be given adjustment assistance?
23. Does the widget qualify for an ecolabel?
24. Do U.S. widget producers use internationally recognized labor
standards?
25. ShouldJapan be buying something more useful than the widget?
The GATT is commonly described as the international agreement
and organization that "governs" world trade.4 8 Therefore, one might won-
der how the GATT would deal with these questions. What do GATT rules
say about these twenty-five questions? The answer is simple: there are no
GATT disciplines on these issues.
On a few of these questions, such as those relating to certain kinds of
unfair trade (e.g., 5, 11, 12, 13, 15, 21 and 24), the GATT allows countries
to take unilateral import action depending on the answers. Yet the GATT
itself would take no action. This would change under the Uruguay
Round, as the GATT would have new disciplines regarding Questions 1149
48. See GATT, supra note 1.
49. Id. art. IV; Agreement on Subsidies and Counterwailing Measures, GATF Doc. MTN/
FA II-13 [hereinafter SCM Agreement], in Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations [hereinafter Uruguay Round], GATT Doc. MTN/
FA (Dec. 15, 1993), 33 I.L.M. 9 (1994), reprinted in OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESEN.
TATIVE, FINAL Acr EMBODYING THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (VERSION OF 15 DECEMBER 1993) (1993).
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and 13.50 This GATT role would be subject to a complaint; it would not
be self-initiated by the GATT Secretariat.
Environmentalists are very interested in Questions 1, 3-9, 14-16, 15,
and 23 which relate to health and environmental issues. The Clinton
Administration seems most interested in Question 17 and least interested
in Question 20. But none of these concerns would resonate in the GATr,
even under the Uruguay Round agreement. What might trigger the
GATT's interest is the non-occurrence of the widget trade. If this resulted
from a Japanese trade restriction, the United States could invoke GATT
procedures to help remove the restriction. These dispute resolution pro-
cedures would be available without regard to any of the above questions.
The GATT is commonly critiqued because it is not dedicated to the
pursuit of sustainable development.5 1 Critics say that the GATT is too ori-
ented toward economic concerns; however, as the above list shows, there
are many commercial issues that are beyond the scope of the GATT.
5 2
Asking the GATT to address the sustainability implications of trade is not
just a slight broadening of the mandate. It is a transmogrification of the
GATT's mission. The confusion results to some extent from the wide-
spread view that the GATT "governs" trade-actually it governs only trade
restrictions.
53
D. The GATT and Environmental Supervision
When environmental standards or taxes are applied to imports, they can
be viewed as trade barriers and may potentially violate the GATr, which
attempts to achieve "reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements
directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade
and the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international com-
merce."54 Insofar as standards and taxes also apply to domestic produc-
tion, they may be GATT-consistent. However, the GATT panel would still
review the standards and taxes as to whether they "afford protection to
domestic production" and as to whether they are "discriminatory," either
50. GATT, supra note 1, art. IV; Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual rop-
erty Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, GATT Doc. MTN/FA II-AIC (Dec. 15,
1993), in Uruguay Round, supra note 49.
51. For a discussion of the concept of sustainable development, see WoRLD
REsouRcEs INSTITUTE, WoRLD REsouRcEs 1992-93 2-3 (1992). See generally EsmY, supra
note 4, at n.2 (Sustainable development is economic growth that "meets the needs of
the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own
needs.") (citations omitted).
52. Questions 2, 10, 14-16, 19, 21, 22.
53. The GATT has no rules about trade itself. For example, it does not say what can
be traded and what cannot be. All governments have such rules (e.g., no liquor sales
after midnight on Saturday) for individuals and businesses. Instead, the GATT has
rules about the utilization of trade restrictions by governments. For example, the
GAIT does not permit governments to set quotas on the number of automobiles that
can be imported.
54. GATT, supra note 1, preamble.
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in law or in practice.55 As Thomas J. Schoenbaum noted, "the GATT
scheme allows each contracting party only limited freedom to determine
its domestic environmental policies."5 6
When environmental restrictions are aimed at imports, such restric-
tions violate certain GATT rules.5 7 Whether a GATT panel will find them
in violation depends upon the application of the health and natural
resource exceptions in Article XX,58 which provides exceptions for meas-
ures "necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health" or for
measures "relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources
... .-59 Under these exceptions, the measure must not arbitrarily or
unjustifiably discriminate between countries where the same conditions
prevail and must not be a "disguised restriction" on trade. Several other
specific tests have been created by GATT panels in recent years.60
This supervisory function of the GATT is controversial because its
influence on environmental policy can only be negative. 61 At best, a panel
will find that an environmental law is acceptable under GATT principles. 62
The more likely outcome is that a panel will rule against an environmental
measure, which will put pressure on the country (particularly small coun-
tries) to revise its law. As the chart below shows, the success rate in bring-
ing a GATT "environmental" complaint is high:
55. See GATT, supra note 1, arts. I, III, and XX. The semantic similarity of environ-
mental "protection" and "protection" of domestic industries is unfortunate and has hin-
dered mutual understanding between the trade and environment camps.
56. ThomasJ. Schoenbaum, Free International Trade and Protection of the Environment:
Irreconcilable Conflict?. 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 700, 713 (1992).
57. Restrictions can violate Article III if they treat an import less favorably than the
like domestic product. They can violate Article XI if they impose a quantitative limit on
imports.
58. In general, Article XX provides an exception to all other GATT articles. It is
unclear whether an Article XXIII:lb complaint (non-violation nullification and impair-
ment) could be invoked against an action justified by Article XX. GATT dispute settle-
ments have not addressed this question.
59. GAT, supra note 1, art. XX(b), (g).
60. Steve Charnovitz, Exploring the Environmental Exceptions in GATT Article X, J.
WORLD TRADE, Oct. 1991, at 37, 47-54. The measure must use the least-GA2T-inconsis-
tent method to qualify under Article XX(b). See Thailand-Restrictions on Importation of
and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, GAiT, B.I.S.D., supra note 1, 37th Supp. 200, para. 74
(1991). The measure must be "primarily aimed at" conservation to qualify under Arti-
cle XX(g). See Canada-Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon,
GATT, B.I.S.D., supra note 1, 35th Supp. 98, paras. 4.4-4.7 (1989) [hereinafter Herring
and Salmon Report].
61. David Wirth, The International TradeRegime and the Municipal Law of Federal States:
How Close A Fit?, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv., 1389, 1397 (1992) ("From an environmental
point of view, the international trade regime as currently structured is a no-win
proposition.").
62. Since the GAT has no rules regulating environmental behavior, it cannot rec-
ommend that the plaintiff country remedy the environmental harm. All it can do is
uphold the right of the defendant country to apply the trade measure.
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Year of Case
Panel Report (Defendant listed) Type Panel Finding
1981 U.S. Tuna Import Ban Illegal
63
1987 U.S. Superfund Border Tax Adjustment Legai64
1987 Canada Herring Export Ban Illegal
65
1990 Thailand Cigarettes Import Ban Illegal
66
1991 U.S. Dolphin I Import Ban Illegal
67
1992 Canada Beer6
8  Excise Tax Legal
69
1994 U.S. Dolphin II Import Ban Illegal
70
1994 U.S. Gas Guzzler Excise Tax Legal
7 1
1994 U.S. CAFE Tax Penalty Illegal
72
199? U.S. Gasoline73  Product Standard Undone Settlement
4
A country with stringent environmental standards thus faces three differ-
ent kinds of potential pressure. First, trade can apply competitive pressure
to firms to lower their standards and to lobby their government for weak-
ened process regulations.75 Second, the enforcement of standards may
trigger adverse reactions in other countries, leading to environmental
retaliation.7 6 Third, trade rules, such as the GATT or other international
63. United States-Prohibitions of Imports of Tuna and Tuna Products from Canada,
GAIT, B.I.S.D., supra note 1, 29th Supp. 91 (1983) [hereinafter Tuna Case].
64. United States-Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances, GATI', B.I.S.D.,
supra note 1, 34th Supp. 136 (1988) [hereinafter Superfund Report]. The U.S. tax on
petroleum was found to be GATT illegal as a facially discriminatory measure. The
"environmental" part of the case related to the tax on certain imported substances.
65. Herring and Salmon Report, supra note 60.
66. Thailand-Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, supra note
60.
67. United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATr, B.I.S.D., supra note 1, 39th
Supp. 155 (1993) [hereinafter Dolphin IReport]. This decision has not been adopted by
the GATT Council.
68. For a discussion, see Beer War Grows as USTRAnnounces 50 Percent Duty on Ontario
Imports, INT'L TRADE REP., July 29, 1992, at 1287; Canadian Brewers Seek to End Beer Dis-
pute, J. COM., Nov. 13, 1992, at 4A. See also Green Groups Letter to Kantor on Beer Dispute,
INSIDE U.S. TRADE, June 4, 1993, at 17.
69. Canada-Import Distribution and Sale of Certain Alcoholic Drinks by Provincial Market-
ing Agencies, GATT, B.I.S.D., supra note 1, 39th Supp. 27 (1992).
70. United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (11), GATr Doc. DS29/R (May 20,
1994), 33 I.L.M. 839 (1994) [hereinafter Dolphin II Report]. See Steve Charnovitz, Dol-
phins and Tuna: An Analysis of the Second GATT Panel Report, 24 E.LR. NEws & ANALYSIS
10,567 (1994). This decision has not been adopted by the GATT Council.
71. Steve Charnovitz, The GATT Panel Decision on Automobile Taxes, 17 IT.'L ENV'T
REP. 921 (1994). This decision has not beenf adopted by the GATT Council.
72. Id. The decision is reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1397 (1994). This decision has not
been adopted by the GATT Council.
73. See Venezuela Moves Toward GA7T Panel Against U.S. Gas Rules, INSIDE U.S. TRiaE,
Feb. 4, 1994, at 7; EsTv, supra note 4, at 128, 270.
74. This case is rapidly evolving as of this writing. The parties have undone a settle-
ment, and Venezuela has filed a case in the GATT. See GATT Panel to Hear Venezuelan
Complaint Against Clean Air Rules, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, OCL 7, 1994, at 4; Congress Upsets
Gasoline Pact Between Venezuela and U.S., J. COM., Sept. 16, 1994, at 2A.
75. WIuIM J. BAUMOL, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, INTERNATIONAL SPILLOVERS
AND TRADE 31-32 (1971).
76. For example, during the Reagan Administration, the EPA argued that it needed
to maintain a fairly high tolerance for the pesticide EDB on imported mangos because
tightening the standard could damage relations with food-exporting nations and lead
to greater risks to American consumers from other pesticides as well as pests or diseases.
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agreements or treaties, can result in legal or diplomatic pressure on a gov-
ernment to weaken its product or process regulations.
7 7
In addition to the potential threat to national environmental laws, the
GATT threatens international environmental agreements. International
cooperation of any sort stumbles on the free rider problem. 78 Notwith-
standing the free rider problem, the GATT system makes it difficult to use
trade measures as a means of enforcement because the GATT is based on
the most-favored-nation (MFN) principle which forbids discrimination
against member nations.79 Thus, treaties like the Montreal Protocol,8 0
which require trade discrimination against non-members who are not fol-
lowing the Protocol's rules on the phase out of CFCs,8 ' may be inconsis-
tent with basic GATT rules.
8 2
A final concern about the GATT's environmental supervision is who is
doing the supervising. Environmentalists question why national environ-
mental laws should be judged by panelists from countries that may have
weaker standards. Furthermore, GATr panelists are generally trade law-
yers or diplomats who may lack environmental expertise. For example, in
calling for the United States to try cooperative efforts to save marine mam-
mals, the Dolphin 183 panel seemed blissfully unaware of the long history
The U.S. Court of Appeals agreed with the EPA, noting that the mango exports gener-
ated funds that foreign producers might use for alternatives to EDB. See National Coali-
tion Against the Misuses of Pesticides v. EPA, 815 F.2d 1579, 1581-82 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
77. See Tim W. Ferguson, One Entangling Edible in the GATT Fight, WALL ST. J., Nov.
23, 1993, at A17 (stating that the GATT is one way for knocking U.S. tuna rules out);
Federal Appellants' Emergency Motion Under Current Rule 27-3 for Stay of Injunction
Pending Appeal at 6, Earth Island Inst. v. Mosbacher (9th Cir.) (No. 92-15126, 92-
15387) (Feb. 3, 1992).
78. Free riders are individuals who act rationally, but anti-socially, by accepting the
benefit of a collective or public good without paying for it. For example, many Euro-
pean transit systems do not collect tickets (but may conduct spot checks). People who
come aboard without buying a ticket are free riders. To take an environmental exam-
ple, if there is a closed season on hunting and yet a hunter goes out at night to hunt
secretly, he is a free rider. He gets the benefit of the wildlife protection without paying
any of the costs (i.e., foregoing hunting). The free rider problem is that it is often
rational for people to be free riders because their benefits will exceed their costs.
The GATT" is not insensitive to the free rider problem. Countries wishing to join the
GATr must "pay" certain entry fees by lowering their trade barriers. If a country does
not become a member of the GATT, it does not gain the right to receive equivalent
favors from GATT members. In other words, the GATr permits discrimination against
non-members analogously to the way that the Montreal Protocol requires such discrimi-
nation. Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16,
1987, 26 I.L.M. 1541, 1550 (1987) (as amended, London, 1990 and Copenhagen, 1992)
[hereinafter Montreal Protocol]. Unlike the Montreal Protocol which any nation can
join, however, the GAT' is exclusionary in its admissions policy.
79. For the text of the most-favored-nation principle, see GATT, supra note 1, art. I.
80. Montreal Protocol, supra note 78.
81. Id. art. IV.
82. Richard Eglin, Speech, Environmental Protection and International Trade-
Genuine Concern or Disguised Protectionism 8 (Aug. 31, 1992) (on file with the Cornell
International Law Journal).
83. Dolphin I Report, supra note 67.
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of unrequited efforts to achieve such cooperation. 84
H. Defogging the Debate85
Part II consists of ten separate sections which discuss key issues in the
debate. There are serious misconceptions surrounding all of these issues,
which frustrate a conciliation of trade and environmental concerns.
A. Free Trade and Environmental Policy
It is sometimes suggested that free trade is antithetical to environmental
policy because free trade connotes deregulation (or no regulation) of
individual actions while environmental policy rests on regulation of indi-
vidual actions.8 6 This suggestion, however, is based on an extremely doc-
trinaire view of free trade. Originally, free trade meant that trade would
not be taxed by tariffs; hence it is free. In typical usage, free trade also
means the absence of special border restrictions.
Free trade does not mean the absence of all regulation of com-
merce.87 The United States is a common market with internal free trade.
However, government regulation-for example, a ban on the possession
of machine guns-is not considered a derogation of free trade. In under-
standing what free trade means, it may be helpful to consider the
counterfactual. The opposite of free trade is the protection of domestic
commerce, not the non-regulation of domestic commerce. As the Ger-
man Federal Ministry for Environment, Nature, and Nuclear Safety
explains, "[f]ree trade does not mean that foreign products are exempted
from the legal provisions that apply for domestic products."88
Government regulation may be inconsistent with the ideal of a free
market. Nevertheless, one must distinguish between measures that are
intended to restrict undesirable market outcomes (e.g., laws against selling
babies) and measures that are intended to correct market failures (e.g.,
antitrust laws). This latter category is not inconsistent with free markets in
practice. Indeed, such measures are designed to remove distortions in
order to move closer toward ideal free market outcomes. Therefore, even
if the term "free trade" is used with a doctrinaire connotation, i.e., viewing
84. This was one of the goals of the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972. See
Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407, 1378(a) (1988 & Supp. V
1993).
85. In an earlier study, the author attempted to defog several other issues in the
trade and environment debate. Those points are not repeated here. See Steve
Charnovitz, The Environment vs. Trade Rules: Defogging the Debate, 23 ENvrL. L. 475
(1993).
86. See LANG & HINES, supra note 30, at 11.
87. Marina v.N. Whitman, Environmentalism and the World Economy, DErnorr NEwS,
Apr. 11, 1993, at B3 (stating that the most committed free traders have long recognized
the legitimacy of government-imposed quality and safety standards, as long as they are
imposed uniformly on domestic and foreign products).
88. BUNDESMINISTERIUM FOR UMvELT NATURScHUTZ UND REAKTORSICHERHEIT (FED-
ERAL MINISTRY FOR ENVIRoNmENT, NATURE, AND NUCLEAR SAFETY), THE PACKAGING ORDI-
NANCE AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 4 (1993).
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it synonymously with "free market," measures intended to correct market
failure would not contradict free trade.
The argument that environmental regulation is inconsistent with lib-
eral trade is especially ironic because the need for government interven-
tion is very obvious for environmental issues. One may disagree as to how
serious certain risks are or as to what instruments should be used (e.g.,
marketable rights versus process regulations), but there is no serious argu-
ment that government intervention is unnecessary. Thus, government
policies that refrain from commercial protectionism and that regulate
environmental interactions are consistent with each other.
B. Trade Policy and Environmental Policy
It is sometimes suggested that trade policy-makers are predisposed to
oppose the use of trade measures for environmental purposes because this
contradicts their mission, which is to lower trade barriers.8 9 According to
one trade expert:
Trade officials endeavor to achieve a more efficient allocation of their
nation's economic resources by expanding opportunities for international
specialization in the production of goods and services through trade. They
accomplish this by reducing barriers to trade and negotiating international
ground rules for policy measures that affect trade. Environmental officials,
on the other hand, strive to sustain economic growth over the long term by
preserving and improving environmental resources. 90
Unfortunately, this pristine portrayal of trade policy-making obfuscates
reality. To illustrate this point, I will briefly examine the Clinton Adminis-
tration's trade policy of the past several months.
Consider these points:
* In the final weeks of the Uruguay Round, the Clinton Administra-
tion successfully pushed through a change in the subsidies text to expand
non-actionable research subsidies.9 1 According to U.S. Trade Representa-
tive Mickey Kantor, such subsidies "enhance our ability to stay on the lead-
ing edge of technology- a step ahead of our competition." Noting that
the U.S. government provides more research and development assistance
to industry than any other country, Kantor explained that "these programs
89. See Daniel Magraw, Environment and Trade: Talking Across Cultures, ENv'T, Mar.
1994, at 19 (stating that the concept of comparative advantage dominates the thinking
on the trade side); see also Esiy, supra note 4, at 36.
90. Geza Feketekuty, The Link Between Trade and Environmental Policy, 2 MINN. J.
GLOBAL TRADE, 171, 172 (1993). Feketekuty is a top career official in the Office of the
U.S. Trade Representative and Chairman of the OECD Trade Committee.
91. SCM Agreement, supra note 49, art. 8, § 2. Non-actionable subsidies are immune
from unilateral countervailing duties. The main changes in the text were: (a) to
increase the permissible subsidy for basic industrial research from 50% to 75%, (b) to
broaden industrial research to include knowledge that may be useful in developing new
products, and (c) to increase the permissible subsidy for applied research (renamed
"pre-competitive development activity") from 25% to 50% and to clarify that it includes
the manufacture of a prototype. For the previous formulation in the 1991 Dunkel Text,
see Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, art. 8, § 2, in "THE DUNKEL DRAWr"
FROM THE GATT SEcRETARiAT (Inst. for International Legal Information ed., 1992).
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have contributed to the restoration of America's competitiveness."
92
- According to Under Secretary of Commerce for International Trade
Jeffrey E. Garten, the Administration has launched a "Government Advo-
cacy" program to coordinate federal government support on behalf of
U.S. companies bidding for major contracts overseas. 98 The program
includes a "full-court press involving everything from financing to foreign
policy pressure."94 According to Commerce Secretary Ron Brown, the
Clinton Administration has "redefined the relationship between business
and government," making government an active partner in the efforts of
U.S. companies to export.95 While the U.S. government has promoted
exports for many decades, the new efforts differ considerably from past
ones.
9 6
- After months of effort by top economic and foreign policy officials
of the Administration to convince Saudi Arabia to buy American-built air-
planes, President Clinton consummated the $6 billion deal by personally
lobbying the King of Saudi Arabia.97 Such official peddling seems to be
inappropriate government behavior, especially for a military super-
power.98 The U.S. Export-Import Bank's financing of the sale further
indicates how far the reality of Clinton Administration policy diverges
from the textbook perception of trade policy as a deregulatory, market-
centric exercise.
99
* After the Japanese refused to give Motorola greater access to its mar-
ket, the Clinton Administration took initial steps to threaten Japan with
trade sanctions.
1 00
9 The U.S. concern over the domestic aluminum industry's low-cost
competition from Russia spurred the Administration to help engineer an
international agreement to limit production of aluminum. 10 1 This will
92. See Kantor Letter on Subsidies, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Feb. 11, 1994, at 13. For further
discussion, see Michael Ebert, Research Subsidies: Not So Fast;J. CoM.,June 9, 1994, at 8A.
93. Under Secretary Jeffrey E. Garten, The Clinton Administration's National
Export Strategy, Remarks Before the National Association of Manufacturers 10-11 (Feb.
17, 1994); U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, COMPETING TO WIN IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 21
(1994).
94. Garten, supra note 93, at 11.
95. See Nancy Dunne, Trade Push Pays Off, Says Brown, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1994, at 6.
96. For a review of U.S. government programs in 1920 to promote foreign com-
merce, see A REPORT ON THE FEDERAL GoyWRNMErr's AcrivrEs IN THE PROMOTION OF
FoREIGN COMMERCE, H.R. Doc. No. 650, 66th Cong., 2d Sess. (1920).
97. Thomas L. Friedman, Saudi Air to Buy $6 Billion in Jets Built in the U.S., N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 17, 1994, at Al (President Clinton sounded like a victorious battle com-
mander just back from the trade wars.); see also Peter Behr, Clinton Helps Raytheon Win
Brazilian Contract; WAsH. POST, July 22, 1994, at Dl.
98. Arthur Salter, The Economic Organization of Peace, 9 FOREIGN Arr. 42, 51 (1930);
Uncle Sam, Salesman, FIN. TIMES (London), May 16, 1994, at 13.
99. See Hobart Rowen, The Saudi Jet Sale Blurs Lines That Shouldn't Be, WASH. PoST,
Feb. 20, 1994, at HI, H4.
100. See Richard Lacayo, Take That! And That!, TIME, Feb. 28, 1994, at 39; James K.
Glassman, Targeting Japan on Trade Hurts Us--and Misses the Point WASH. PoST, Feb. 25,
1994, at B1.
101. See Aluminum Cartel J. COM., Feb. 22, 1994, at 8A, Aluminum Pact Is Set to Curb
World Output; WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 1994, at A3.
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hurt Russia, which already has serious economic woes.
* In August 1994, the Clinton Administration established an informal
quota on Canadian wheat. 10 2 Reportedly, this action resulted from a deal
the Administration had made to get Senate votes for the NAFTA.'
03
With the possible exception of the Motorola episode, none of these
policies are about liberalizing trade by expanding opportunities for inter-
national specialization.' 0 4 Instead they represent the government's efforts
to distort or manage trade for commercial purposes. 10 5 Thus, it is delu-
sional to suggest that trade policy-makers do not see the need for environ-
mental trade measures because of their single-minded focus on lowering
trade barriers. In reality, trade policy is at least as much about resisting
liberalization as it is about embracing it.10 6 If trade policy were only about
opening markets, trade barriers would be extinct or at least
endangered.
10 7
The Clinton Administration is not the first administration to take this
approach to trade policy; previous administrations have behaved simi-
larly.108 American trade policy is regularly aimed at many purposes other
than freeing up trade. When trade advocates say trade policy should not
be used for environmental purposes as a matter of principle, many envi-
ronmentalists have assumed that the principle was free trade. Actually, the
principle at stake is reserving trade leverage for commercial purposes
rather than putting it to use for environmental purposes.
C. Openness
The GATT is based on the long-established doctrine of "national treat-
ment." 0 9 This means that countries cannot treat imported products any
102. Helene Cooper, Canada Agrees to Slash Wheat Exports to U.S. as Nations Avert Trade
War, WALL ST. J., Aug. 2, 1994, at A2.
103. The Wheat Quota, J. CoM., July 5, 1994, at 6A.
104. For additional examples, see James Bovard, Silken Import Disport, WASH. TIMES,
Mar. 15, 1994, at A17 (The silk quotas on China symbolize the Clinton Administration's
contempt for the American consumer.); John Maggs, Clinton Team Spells Out Plan to
Fund GATT Pact, J. COM., Apr. 6, 1994, at IA, 10A ("Clinton Administration officials
have bragged to farm state lawmakers that the new trade pact will allow them to subsi-
dize 7.5 million tons more of grain a year.").
105. See Michael Prowse, Prussian in the White House, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1994, at 16
("No true market liberal would brag about winning contracts for businessmen, or set
unilateral targets for another nation's imports, or pour taxpayers' funds into a domestic
industrial policy."); see also Mr. Clinton: Defend Your Trade Pledge, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19,
1994, at A26 (In Marrakesh, the Administration stood for open trade and economic
growth. At home, it proposes sizable doses of protectionism.).
106. George Melloan, Business Should Be Wary of Trade Politics, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28,
1994, at A15 ("[Tihe Clintonites, no sticklers for either consistency or logic, simply
think they can play the politics of managed trade and free trade simultaneously.").
107. Moreover, if trade officials were single-mindedly trying to lower trade barriers,
they would have more credibility with environmentalists. Presently, trade officials
preach of the dangers of back door protectionism even while advocating front door
protectionism.
108. See, e.g., JAMES BovARD, THE FAIR TRADE FRAUD (1991).
109. GATT, supra note 1, art. III.
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less favorably than domestically-made products. 110 Recently, however, the
world trading system has been evolving toward a new doctrine of "open-
ness" which seeks to eliminate economic borders."' This encompasses
national treatment but demands more. 112 Barriers to foreign goods, serv-
ices, or investment would no longer be justifiable as mere extensions of
domestic regulation.
To better understand the doctrine of openness, consider two stan-
dards-an eco-label and a requirement that bottles or newsprint have a
minimum recycled content. Both standards would probably be deemed
consistent with GATT rules so long as they are applied equally to domestic
and imported products. However, under the principle of openness, an
exporting country could object to an eco-label on the grounds that foreign
producers have no role in setting the criteria for the eco-label. Similarly,
Country A could object to recycled content requirements in Country B on
the grounds that recycling is not the normal practice in Country A. In
other words, Country B should be open to foreign bottles and cans no
matter how they are produced.
This example leads to the broader question of whether openness con-
flicts with environmental diversity. Can governments retain their own
environmental standards for what may be sold in their country (e.g.,
dolphin-safe tuna), or will the GATT insist that markets be open to exports
from all countries no matter how loosely regulated the production process
is? GATT rules seem predicated on safeguarding the diversity of produc-
tion rather than permitting diversity among consuming nations. A coun-
try where public opinion is very concerned about the safety of dolphins
may not have the right under GATr rules to close its market to offending
products.
The issue of openness also arises with respect to controls on
exports. 113 Can a country retain its timber, its fish, or its water for domes-
tic, use?114 This issue was considered in the GATT in 1988 when a panel
ruled that Canada could not ban the export of salmon and herring.115
But when the issue of water transfers between Canada and the United
States threatened to become controversial in the NAFTA, the Clinton
Administration declared that the NAFTA's rule against export bans did




111. Openness is the disappearance of economic borders. Goods, investment, and
services should flow without impedance between countries.
112. SeeJohn H.Jackson, "Managing Economic Interdependence"--An Overview, 24 L. &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1025, 1029-30 (1993).
113. See PATRICIA W. BIRNIE & ALAN Bovi., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRON-
MENT 132-33 (1992) (stating that unrestricted free trade in commodities conflicts with
environmental protection requirements).
114. See CHARLEs ARDEN-CLARxE, GREEN PROTECTIONISM 9 (WWF Int'l Discussion
Paper, 1994).
115. Herring and Salmon Report supra note 60.
116. See USTR Assures Congress on Water Exports to Gain NAFTA Support, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Nov. 19, 1993, at S-12.
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Some environmentalists hold that regions ought to be self-sufficient
in food and other necessities. From this perspective, international rules
requiring all goods to be tradeable can appear to be anti-environment.
Other environmentalists deny the significance of self-sufficiency in a
global economy and ecosystem that already entails interdependence.
From this perspective, international trade can do no harm so long as the
underlying production is environmentally sound.
Just as more openness might be better for the world economy, less
openness might be better for the world environment. International envi-
ronmental problems arise because environmental borders are permeable.
If the consequences of bad environmental practices were confined to the
country which engaged in them, there would be less public concern.
Unfortunately, there are no instruments for reducing environmental
openness.
If the world economy was matched by a world polity, openness would
undoubtedly be a good principle. The problem we have is that economic
policy integration is outpacing global environmental policy integration.
In the absence of an international institution that mandates sound envi-
ronmental policies, nations are left to fend for themselves. Thus, it may
not be advantageous for nations to forswear certain economic tools (like
border controls) that might be useful in securing more necessary environ-
mental cooperation.
D. Discrimination
The GATT is based on the principle of non-discrimination whereas envi-
ronmental policy relies on discrimination. For example, an environmen-
tal trade measure might distinguish between fish caught in a driftnet and
fish caught with regular nets, or between chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs)
from a Montreal Protocol pariy and CFCs from a non-party.
This distinction is an important one, but there are several reasons why
it should not be carried too far. First, the GATT does allow some discrimi-
nation. For instance, countervailing l i1 and anti-dumping 1 8 duties are
permitted against "unfair" trade.1 19 Second, the GAIT has taken action to
permit discriminatory preferences for developing countries. 12 0 Third,
117. Countervailing duties are discriminatory taxes applied to imports for the pur-
pose of offsetting the benefit gained by a foreign good because of a government sub-
sidy. The countervailing duty may not necessarily equalize the cost of production
because it is calibrated to the gross foreign subsidy, not to the extent that the foreign
subsidy exceeds any domestic subsidy (i.e., the net foreign subsidy).
118. Anti-dumping duties are discriminatory taxes applied to imports for the pur-
pose of offsetting the benefit gained by a foreign producer from underpricing its good.
119. See GATT, supra note 1, art. VI. It might also be noted that Article VI permits
distinctions to be made based on one aspect of the production process of a good,
namely its pricing.
120. Generalized System of Preferences, GATT Doc. L/3545 (June 25, 1971), B.I.S.D.,
supra note 1, 18th Supp. 24 (1970-71); Differential and More Favourable Treatment Reciproc-
ity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries, GAIT Doc. L/4903 (Nov. 28, 1979),
B.I.S.D., supra note 1, 26th Supp. 203 (1978-79).
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Article XX permits discrimination under certain circumstances. 121
Fourth, the GATT's national security exceptions permit discrimination.
122
In addition, it must be remembered that the GATT's .non-discrimina-
tion rules are inextricably linked to the concept of "like product."123 Like
product is a variable concept.' 24 Driftnet-caught fish could be deemed an
"unlike" product to fish caught using benign techniques. Aquiculture fish
could be deemed an "unlike" product to fish caught in oceans or rivers. If
so, then treating such fish differently is not discrimination.
When products are "like," then taxing or regulating them differently
is discrimination. For example, a country might apply a requirement for
pesticide-free vegetables to domestic production and to all imported prod-
ucts, but a potential exporter might view it as discriminatory on the
grounds that the vegetables are "like" no matter what their pesticide con-
tent is. A country might apply a recycled fiber content for newsprint to
domestic production and to all imported products, but a potential
exporter might view it as discriminatory on the grounds that newsprint is
"like" no matter what its recycled content is. A country might allow impor-
tation of an endangered species only if it is captive-bred, but a potential
exporter might say that "likeness" should not depend on how the species is
harvested. Recently, Canada amended a law125 regulating the retail sale of
dogs from wholesale breeding facilities (known as puppy mills) after the
Bush and Clinton Administrations complained, in effect, that dogs were
dogs no matter how they were raised.'
26
E. Balancing
Not all applications of environmental policy are appropriate. Govern-
ments may disguise a trade restriction as a health or environmental mea-
sure.127 Governments may also impose ineffective or unnecessary
environmental regulations. Such regulations may result from inadequate
risk assessment or public paranoia.
121. See Japan-Customs Duties, Taxes and Labelling Practices on Imported Wines and Alco-
holic Beverages, GATT Doc. L/6216 (Nov. 10, 1987), B.I.S.D., supra note 1, 34th Supp. 83,
para. 5.9(d) (1986-87). Parties may not use "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between countries where the same conditions prevail." GATI, supra note 1, art. XX.
122. GATI, supra note 1, art. XXI.
123. For a discussion, see JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAw OF GATI
258-63 (1969). This section was written before the GATT Auto Taxes Panel issued its
decision. If adopted, this decision would clarify the "like product" concept in some
ways.
124. See Steve Charnovitz, Green Roots, Bad Pruning GATT Rules and Their Application
to Environmental Trade Measures, 7 TuL. ENvTL LJ. 299, 306 (1994).
125. See Health of Animals Regulations, 126 C. GAz. 2931 (1992) (Can.); see also Let-
ter from the Humane Society of the United States to Sanford Gaines, Deputy Assistant
U.S. Trade Representative (Feb. 23, 1993) (on file with the Cornell International Law
Journa).
126. See Clyde Farnsworth, Next Trade War Target May Be Dogs, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2,
1992, at DI.
127. See Tara Patel, Deja Vu All Over Again: French Fish Row Evokes Past BattlesJ. COM.,
Mar. 3, 1994, at 1A.
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It will often not be easy to decide when there is an ulterior motive.
For example, since 1905, the U.S. government has prohibited the importa-
tion of any drug intended for causing abortion.128 There is now a drug
(i.e., RU-486), widely available in Europe, that stimulates a safe abortion.
Roussel-Uclaf (which manufactures the drug) might reasonably ask
whether the U.S. ban is disguised protectionism in favor of American
abortionists.
129
In considering the problem of inappropriate environmental policies,
it may be helpful to start with a hypothetical situation of a sensible envi-
ronmental regulation (or tax) that applies to a product that is sourced
100% domestically. This presents no trade problems. But loosen either of
the assumptions and trade problems may occur. A sensible regulation or
tax on products that come seventy-five percent from foreign sources may
raise suspicions in foreign countries as to whether there is a hidden com-
mercial motivation. A regulation not fully sensible will inconvenience for-
eign suppliers if they have to adapt their production process to meet it.
The more costly and prescriptive the regulation, the more concerned for-
eign producers will become. The most difficult trade and environmental
conflicts occur when countries impose regulations that are not sensible
and that fall totally or nearly totally on foreign suppliers.
The current provisions in the GATT go only part way toward address-
ing this problem. Article III restricts taxes that "afford protection to
domestic production." 3 0 Article XX disallows "arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail" and
disallows any "disguised restriction on international trade." 13 ' Article
XX(b) requires that health measures be "necessary"' 3 2 and Article XX(g)
requires a link to restrictions on domestic production or consumption. 13 3
These same provisions apply when import bans are used rather than
domestic standards.
The reason for these provisions was to prevent the misuse of trade
measures for protectionist purposes. The authors of the GATT had no
intention of using trade rules to review how sensible domestic policies
were. Instead, Article XX establishes a strong deference to sovereignty
and national decision-making.' 34 It was designated as an improvement
over earlier trade agreements which provided complete deference. For
128. Act of Feb. 8, 1905, ch. 550, 33 Stat. 705 (1908) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 1462(c) (1988)) (The original session law, unlike the current codified version,
did not use the word "drug." See 18 U.S.C. § 1462, historical notes.).
129. In actuality, the company is not anxious to provide it to the American market.
See Lawrence Lader, RU-486, Made in America, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1994, at A23.
130. GATr, supra note 1, art. III, para. 1.
131. Id. art. XX.
132. Id. art. XX(b). There are several possible meanings of the term "necessary":
(1) necessary in a scientific sense, (2) necessary in a policy choice sense, in that other
options will not work, or (3) necessary in the proportionality sense that it is cost
effective.
133. Id. art. XX(g).
134. But cf. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, International Trade Law and International Envi-
ronment Law-Prevention and Settlement of International Disputes in GATT, J. WoRLD TRADE,
Vol 27
1994 Free Trade, Fair Trade, Green Trade
example, the Romania-U.S. Commercial Agreement of 1930 stated that
nothing limited the right of either party "to impose, on such terms as it
may see fit, prohibitions or restrictions of a sanitary character ...."135
In recent years, there have been many efforts to develop principles
for the GATr to use to determine whether a country can apply its environ-
mental and health measures to imports.13 6 Some of these have been
accomplished through GATT panel decisions. For example, in the Thai-
land Cigarette case,' 37 the GATT panel put forward the view that for a
measure to be deemed "necessary" under Article XX(b), a country had to
use the least GATT inconsistent measure available. l3 8 In the Canada Her-
ring and Salmon case, the GATr panel put forward the view that for a
measure to fit under Article XX(g), it had to be "primarily aimed at"
conservation.
1 39
The Uruguay Round agreements on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Stan-
dards (SPS) 140 and on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT)14 1 impose
tough new disciplinary measures on national health and environmental
measures with trade effects.142 Under SPS, measures must: (1) be "neces-
sary" to protect life or health, 1
43 (2) be "based on scientific principles,"
x44
(3) not be "maintained without sufficient scientific evidence," 145 (4) "not
arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between members where identical
or similar conditions prevail," 146 (5) be based on a risk assessment, 147 and
(6) not be maintained "if there is another measure, reasonably available
Feb. 1993, at 43, 72 (suggesting that Article XX would not apply if a dispute can be
settled through negotiation and compensation).
135. Provisional Commercial Agreement, Aug. 20, 1930, U.S.-Rom., art. IV(e), 115
L.N.T.S. 115, 119.
136. This effort began over 20 years ago. See The Restrictive Effect of Industrial Stan-
dards on International Commerce, 4 L. & POL'v INT'L Bus. 607 (1972).
137. Thailand-Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, supra note
60, para. 74.
138. It is not clear how to measure relative GATT inconsistency. Is a law violating
Article III more GATT inconsistent than a law violating Article XI?
139. Herring and Salmon Report, supra note 60, para. 4.7.
140. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitay Measures, GATT Doc.
MTN/FA II-A1A-4 (Dec. 15, 1993) [hereinafter SPS Agreement], in Uruguay Round, supra
note 49.
141. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, GATT Doc. II- A1A-6 (Dec. 15, 1993)
[hereinafter TBT Agreement], in Uruguay Round, supra note 49.
142. But if the measure is based on an international standard, these disciplines do
not apply. See SPS Agreementn supra note 140, art. 3(2) (par. 10) (The SPS Agreement
citations were changed at Marrakesh in April 1994. Hereinafter, the former citations to
the SPS Agreement will follow the present citations in parentheticals.)
143. Id. art. 3(2) (para. 6).
144. Id.
145. Id. When relevant scientific evidence is insufficient, parties may provisionally
adopt SPS measures on the basis of "available pertinent information." But parties shall
seek to obtain additional information necessary for a "more objective assessment of
risk." See id. art. 5 (7) (para. 22). It is unclear how an "objective" assessment of risk is to
be used to determine the appropriateness of SPS measures.
146. Id. art. 2(3) (para. 7). Note that this is more restrictive than the headnote in
Article XX which applies only when the "same" conditions prevail.
147. Id. art. 5(1) (para. 16).
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... that achieves the appropriate level of protection and is significantly less
restrictive to trade."
148
Consider an example. Maine prohibits the sale of irradiated food.149
Even though this measure applies equally to domestic and foreign food, a
GATT panel could judge this law by all of the above standards. The panel
might question whether there is sufficient scientific evidence. The panel
might suggest that a label on the food would be significantly less restrictive
to trade than an actual ban. Other difficult health issues that could come
before GATT panels involve hormones in beef and milk and genetically
engineered food.' 50
Under TBT, national measures' 5 ' must "not be more trade-restrictive
than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective"152 and "shall not be main-
tained if the circumstances or objectives giving rise to their adoption no
longer exist or if the changed circumstances or objectives can be
addressed in a less trade-restrictive manner."153 For example, consider
measures specifying recycling content, eco-labels concerning the produc-
tion process, eco-packaging rules, and corporate performance require-
ments on electric vehicle sales.' 5 4 GATT panels may determine whether
the purpose of the regulation constitutes a "legitimate" objective and may
suggest less trade-restrictive alternatives. It is unclear whether the panel
may only point to alternatives regulated by TBT (for example, a label
rather than a content requirement)' 5 5 or may point to any other alterna-
tive, even those not regulated by TBT, such as an international agreement
or a domestic taxation.
All of the requirements of SPS and TBT would be new disciplines that
have never before been imposed in GATT environmental disputes. These
disciplines remove the shield of national treatment for standards, but not
for taxes.
Neither the TBT nor the SPS agreements deal with import bans
aimed at safeguarding the global commons or a foreign environment.
Some commentators believe that such unilateral measures are, and should
148. Id. art. 5(6) (para. 21 & n.3). In addition, art. 5(5) (para. 20) applies a consis-
tency discipline to the choice of the level of protection. Under this provision, it might
be argued that a country that permits cigarette smoking should not be more protective
regarding other risks.
149. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 2155(10) (West 1992).
150. If these issues lie outside the SPS Agreement, they would be regulated by the
TBT Agreement. Defendant countries will probably prefer to be judged under the TBT
rules.
151. But if the measure is based on an international standard, there is a rebuttable
presumption in favor of the measure. See TBTAgreemen; supra note 141, art. 2.5.
152. Id. art. 2.2.
153. Id. art. 2.3.
154. For a good discussion of the GATT implications of some of these issues, see
Vinod Rege, GATT Law and Environment-Related Issues Affecting the Trade of Developing
Countries, J. WoRLD TRADE, June 1994, at 95, 109-39.
155. In a recent decision, the European Court ofJustice (ECJ) found that a Belgian
law banning bread with more than a prescribed level of salt violated the Treaty of Rome
because a label could have been used instead. See Restrictions on Imports Lawful FIN.
TiMEs, July 26, 1994, at 12.
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remain, GATT-illegal. 15 6 Others admit that such measures may be needed
in some cases and are trying to devise new international rules on when
they should be permitted and when they should be prohibited. As typi-
cally developed, such rules would include criteria such as trade restrictive-
ness15 7 and scientific evidence, 158 but they would also include other
considerations like "proportionality"'
59 and "legitimacy."160
"Proportionality" means that the trade impact and cost of a measure
should bear a reasonable relationship to the importance of the social
objective it is designed to achieve. 161 "Legitimacy" means that the pur-
pose of the measure should be widely recognized as a legitimate concern
of the government imposing the measure.162 When a complaint is
brought about an environmental measure, all of these considerations (i.e.,
science,' 63 trade-restrictiveness, 16 proportionality, and legitimacy) would
be used by a panel to determine whether the environmental measure
could be used.
Since trade restrictiveness, proportionality, and legitimacy' 65 are con-
sidered in adjudication in the European Union (to determine when
national measures can be used) and in the United States (to determine
when state measures can be used), 16 6 many commentators and govern-
ments167 have suggested that the same sort of balancing can be performed
156. See, e.g., Schoenbaum, supra note 56, at 723.
157. The same requirement appears in U.S. adjudication over the Commerce Clause.
See, e.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
158. It is interesting to note that one of the earliest treaties providing for an environ-
mental dispute tribunal allowed each nation to designate a scientist to help the tribu-
nal. See Convention Between the United States and Canada, Apr. 15, 1935, U.S.-Can.,
art. 2, 49 Stat. 3245, 3246.
159. Feketekuty, supra note 90, at 201.
160. See Esrv, supra note 4, at 115, 220-21. See generally RuNGE, supra note 4.
161. See Feketekuty, supra note 90, at 201.
162. Id.
163. For a discussion of the role of science in the U.S. reciprocal trade agreements
program, see Extending Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act: Hearings before the Committee on
Finance, United States Senate, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 496-97 (letter from H.A. Wallace, Sec-
retary of Agriculture).
164. Numerous problems with the trade restrictiveness test have been discussed else-
where, so they will not be repeated here. See Steve Chamovitz, GATT and the Environ-
ment: Examining the Issues, INT'L ENvrt. Ass., Summer 1992, at 203, 212-15. But it might
be noted that the test is even more problematic with respect to taxes. See Ludwig
Krimer, Environmental Protection and Article 30 EEC Treaty, 30 COMMON MK'T. L. Rrv. 111,
143 (1993).
165. The role of science will be discussed infra part II.F.
166. For example, see Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality of Ore-
gon, 114 S. Ct. 1345 (1944). For a comparison of the E.U. and U.S. practice, see
Damien Geradin, Free Trade and Environmental Protection in an Integrated Market: A Survey
of the Case Law of the United States Supreme Court and the European Court ofJustice, 2 FLA. ST.
U. J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 141, 197 (1993).
167. It is interesting to note that Canada advocates this rule for international trade,
even though it does not follow such a rule for domestic commerce. See Charles
Trueheart, Trade Barriers Still Hogtie Canada-Those Between Provinces, WAsH. PosrJan. 7,
1994, at A12. For a statement by the Canadian government that Article XX(b) requires
a least trade restrictive test, see Puerto Rico Regulations on the Import, Distribution and Sale
of U.H.T. Milk fom Quebec, 5 WonLD TRADE MA'rERms 53, 86 (1993).
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at the international level, perhaps by the GATT.xta There would be many
problems, however, with grafting such procedures onto the GATT? in order
to create an "international commerce clause."' 6
9
First, the fact that federal governments use this approach for sub-
national laws does not mean that they would want a supra-national institu-
tion to use it for national laws. The United States can impose such
restraints because its political union was, as the Supreme Court noted,
"framed upon the theory that the peoples of the several states must sink or
swim together... ."170 For better or worse, this level of consciousness has
not yet overtaken all nations. There is no world political union.
If the Supreme Court disallows a state environmental measure, the
state can go to Congress and attempt to enact the measure nationwide.
Similarly, in the European Union, countries may seek a Commission regu-
lation or directive to achieve upward harmonization. But a country losing
a GATT environmental dispute cannot go to the GATT Council and ask
for parliamentary action to raise world environmental standards. The
GATT consists of only negative disciplines; it has no competence for posi-
tive rule-making. Moreover, unlike the U.S. Supreme Court or the Euro-
pean Court of Justice, the GATT is not linked to any parallel institution
with legislative power.
It should also be noted that although the United States applies this
rule to the states and the E.U. applies it to member nations, such a rule is
not applied to actions by Congress or the European Commission. 171 In
other words, Congress does not impose a proportionality rule as a self-
discipline on its actions. While some federal laws mandate a cost-benefit
test, many others do not.' 72
A second reason why this adjudicative approach is not transferable to
the GATT is that the Supreme Court and the European Court of Justice
168. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, International Trade and Environment: Lessons from the
Federal Experience, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1329 (1992); Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Reconciling
International Trade with Preservation of the Global Commons: Can We Prosper and Protect?,
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1407 (1992). For an earlier discussion of the problem, see Ralph
C. d'Arge & Allen V. Kneese, Environmental Quality and International Trade, 26 INT'L
ORG., 419, 438-39 (1972).
169. It is sometimes said that since the GAT' already looks at whether national envi-
ronmental standards are too high, the GATT could be improved by empowering it also
to look at whether standards are too low. This might be an improvement. But the
premise is wrong. The GATT's role is to determine whether environmental standards
are protectionist, not whether they are unwise regulation.
170. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935).
171. In addition, the United States does not apply its interstate commerce rules to
imports, and the European Union does not apply its analogous rules to trade from
outside the Union. See Geradin, supra note 166. Since the European Commission
seems to believe that the GATT should require proportionality, one wonders why the
Commission does not impose this discipline on its own import policies.
172. For example, under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act,
the EPA must register a pesticide if it will not generally cause "unreasonable adverse
effects on the environment." See 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c) (5) (D) (1988). An example of a
statute that does not permit the consideration of economic factors is the Delaney clause
of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. See 21 U.S.C. §§348(c)(3) (A),
376(b) (5) (B) (1988).
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are highly respected institutions. It is hard to imagine how public esteem
could similarly exist for GATT panels. It barely exists for the International
Court of Justice, which is an independent body of respected jurists. Why
then could one expect the U.S. public (or the Indian or French public) to
accept a decision regarding an environmental matter by a largely
unknown GATT panel?
Furthermore, if the Supreme Court issues a very unpopular opinion,
it can be changed either by Congress, constitutional amendment, or
future appointees to the Court. But if a GATT? panel issues an opinion
unpopular with the world citizenry, there is no direct way for a sovereign
nation to change it. Under the new Uruguay Round rules, panel decisions
(or appeals from these decisions), shall be adopted unless the Dispute Set-
tlement Body decides by consensus not to adopt it.17 Consensus would
be a formidable requirement even in a world of democracies. But the
GATT has no requirement that its members be democracies.
Third, the E.U. and U.S. judicial tests continue to evolve and are very
complicated.174 Therefore, it is hard to imagine how inserting a version
of these tests into the GATT would lead to predictable dispute settlement.
While the lack of predictability is acceptable in a national system, it may
undermine an international system quickly. The objectivity of ad hoc pan-
elists, as opposed to full-time judges, will also lead to suspicion in contro-
versial cases.
Fourth, a proportionality criterion is especially troublesome because
it necessitates a comparison of costs to benefits. 175 For example, assume
that the United States bans tuna from Mexico because such tuna is not
dolphin-safe. A GATT panel, guided by proportionality, would want to
weigh the commercial costs to Mexico against the environmental benefits
to the United States. Are the costs to Mexico the gross costs (i.e., the value
of the potential U.S. trade) or the net costs (i.e., subtracting what Mexico
received when it sold the tuna elsewhere)? Are these costs recurring, or
should Mexico be able to adapt after the first year?17 6 How does one cal-
culate the benefits of saving some dolphins?
Even if one could get objective numbers for costs and benefits, there
is a difficulty in weighing them because one must compare utilities across
countries. Suppose, for example, that the panel concluded that the cost
to Mexico was $50,000 and the benefit to the United States was $75,000.
From that, it might be concluded that the U.S. import ban should be per-
mitted. But it could be argued that the size of the country matters; in
173. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, GATr
Doc. II-A2, §§ 16.4, 17.14 (Dec. 15, 1993), in Uruguay Round, supra note 49.
174. See Geradin, supra note 166; Daniel Farber & Robert Hudec, Free Trade and the
Regulatory State: A GATT's-Eye View of the Dormant Commerce Claus 47 VAND L. REv. 1401
(1994).
175. For a discussion of the need for weighing and balancing, see RUNGE, supra note
4, at 15, 85; see also EsTY, supra note 4, at 57, 71, 110, 241.
176. The same issue arises with regard to compensation. If Mexico wins its GATT?
complaint and the GATT allows it to retaliate against the United States, should the
retaliation be allowed to continue longer than one year?
Cornell International Law Journal
other words, the panel should look at cost per capita. It could also be
argued that the wealth of the country matters; perhaps $50,000 to Mexico
means more than $75,000 to the United States. Doing inter-country com-
parisons of utility would be difficult.
A further problem concerns the preferences of parties not in the dis-
pute. For example, other countries might also place a value on the dol-
phins. As the dolphins live in the global commons, it would seem
impossible to ignore these countries' preferences. Moreover, how are the
views of future generations to be counted, particularly in cases leading to
irreversible changes? The discount rate applied to future benefits will
strongly influence the result of any cost-benefit analysis.
Even a brief review of these methodological problems demonstrates
that a proportionality test will not lead to unequivocal results regarding
costs and benefits. Of course, national policy-makers make laws all the
time based on closejudgments. But it seems doubtful that national policy-
makers will want an international panel to second-guess such judgments
using methods that perforce are subjective.
177
Two approaches have been put forward to deal with this problem.
One is the mindreading method used by the Canada-U.S. Salmon and
Herring panel which avoids inter-country balancing.178 The case (under
the Free Trade Agreement) involved a Canadian requirement that fish
caught in Canadian waters be off-landed for biological counting.179 The
United States argued that the additional costs of landing discouraged
exports.' 80 Canada responded that the landing requirement was non-dis-
criminatory as it applied to Canadian as well as foreign fishermen.' 8 ' In
deciding the case, the panel disavowed an effort to weigh the trade versus
the environmental interests of each country.' 8 2 Instead, the panel tried to
decide whether the measure would be rational from the Canadian per-
spective if none of the fish were harvested by foreigners.' 83 Inserting
themselves into the minds of Canadian policy-makers, the panel con-
cluded that such a Canadian requirement would not have been logical18
4
The other method is to maintain inter-country balancing but to move
the fulcrum away from the country defending its environmental law. The
177. It is interesting to note that Canada argued against balancing in the Beer I case.
"The General Agreement was not designed to protect the commercial considerations
that led foreign brewers not to establish collection systems; nor should cost be cited to
prevent a government from implementing environmental measures pursuant to Article
XX(b)." Canada-Inport, Distribution and Sale of Certain Alcoholic Drinks by Provincial Mar-
keting Agencies, supra note 69, para. 4.73.
178. Canada's Landing RequirementforPafic Coast Salmon and Herring, WoRuD TRAD
MATEA.~s, Mar. 1990, at 78 [hereinafter Canada's Landing Requirement].
179. Id. 1 2.03.
180. Id. 1 5.01.
181. Id. 1 5.02.
182. Id. 11 7.05-7.06.
183. Id. 1 7.07-7.10, 7.35. For a Supreme Court case considering whether a state
was making other states bear the full costs, see Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337
(1979).
184. Canada's Landing Requiremen supra note 178, 7.38.
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panel would still weigh costs and benefits but would give a great degree of
deference to the environmental standard. This might be called a "dispro-
portionality"' 85 standard. Daniel Esty, one of the proponents of this
approach, explains that there would be no close calls.
18 6
Either of these methods would be better than absolute proportional-
ity. But there is an even better option, which is to eschew an international
balancing test.1 87 Industrial countries' governments are already suffering
because the public thinks that decision-makers are too distant and unac-
countable. Yielding more power to the GATT would seem the very oppo-
site of subsidiarity. The dissatisfaction of the citizens of a country losing a
case in the GATr is likely to be greater than the satisfaction of the citizens
of a winning country.
This is not to suggest that the GATT has no role in environmental
trade disputes. The GATT has a very important role. Itsjob is to examine
a measure to determine whether it constitutes protectionism. One way to
perform this function is to consider where the burden of a measure
falls.188 If the products affected by the measure are 100% imported, the
measure should be rebuttably presumed to be disguised protectionism.
89
For example, the European Court of Justice invalidated a French tax on
autos based on horsepower for just that reason.' 90 (On the other hand,
an asbestos ban in a country that produces none might rise above suspi-
cion because of the harmfulness of asbestos.) If the products affected by
the measure are ninety-nine percent domestic and one percent imported,
then an inconvenience to the foreign producer would not seem to be the
motive.'
9 '
Of course, it will be the in-between cases that are the most difficult.
Case law in the European Union suggests a useful principle. So long as a
significant proportion of domestic production falls within each of the "tax
categories," then applying such objective categories to foreign products
should not constitute disguised discrimination. 192 The same principle
185. This term was used by the European Court ofJustice in the Danish Bottles case.
See Case 302/86, Commission v. Kingdom of Denmark, 1988 E.C.R. 4607. It is unclear
whether it is being used in contradistinction to the opinion of the Advocate General
who supported "balancing." See Geradin, supra note 166, at 183-85.
186. See Esnr', supra note 4, at 117, 129.
187. Steve Charnovitz, Trade and Environment: Four Schools of Thought ECODECISION,
Jan. 1994, at 23.
188. See RUNGE, supra note 4, at 15-19.
189. But see the ECJ decision in Vinal SpA. v. Orbat SpA., where the Court held that
differential taxes on two types of alcohol were not invalid even though the product
subject to the heavier taxation is exclusively imported. Case 46/80, Vinal SpA. v. Orbat
SpA., 32 C.M.L.R. 524, para. 18 (1981).
190. Case 112/84, Michel Humblot v. Directeur, 2 C.M.L.R. 338 (1986).
191. As the Canada's Landing Requirement Panel noted, it may not be easy to deter-
mine the approximate percentages. See Canada's LandingRequirement supra note 178,
7.36.
192. Case 243/84, John Walker & Sons, Ltd. v. Ministeriet, 2 C.M.L.R. 278, 330-31
(1986). This seems consistent with the negotiating history for GATr Article III. See Rex
J. Zeddalis, A Theory of GATT "Like" Product Common Language Cases, 27 VAND. J. TrMNS-
NAT'L L. 33, 67-68 & n.93.
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could be used in examining regulations for disguised protectionism.
The GATr'sjob also includes examining measures to assure that they
are not arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination under Article XX.' 93 In
doing so, the GATT can consider whether a regulation is too tightly writ-
ten. In other words, if there is an alternative regulation that would: (1)
provide equivalent impact, or be equally effective at meeting the defend-
ant country's environmental goals, (2) be politically feasible and reason-
ably available to the defendant country,'94 and (3) be less trade restrictive,
then a GAIT panel could suggest that the alternative regulation be
applied to imports. The plaintiff country should have the burden of sug-
gesting the alternative regulation that it would prefer and showing how it
meets the three points above.
The GAIT should also enforce the Article XX headnote which
includes a soft national treatment test. This is a powerful discipline that
has been underutilized by the GATT. Many of the trade/environment
conflicts have involved measures that seemed to fail this test in that the
discipline being applied to foreign producers was not the same as that
being applied to domestic producers. For example, the U.S. Marine Mam-
mal Protection Act does not apply numerical dolphin mortality limits to
American producers the same way it does to foreign producers.' 95 The
Dolphin panel noted this,'96 but it did not connect the omission to the
requirements in the Article XX headnote. 197 Had the panel issued a far
narrower decision using the soft national treatment test, it would not have
brought such opproprium to the GATT.
The GATT should supervise the means used to achieve ends, but it
should not supervise the ends themselves.' 98 Most commentators who
favor introducing a proportionality test into the GAT (or who think the
GATT already has one) want to weigh commercial and environmental fac-
tors against each other. 9 By contrast, this article takes the position that
the GAIT should not attempt to judge ends. Issues such as legitimacy
(i.e., whether the goal of the measure is appropriate) or proportionality
(whether the benefits exceed the costs), should not be put into GATT's
tool kit. Having the GAT judge the merit of environmental laws will dis-
tract it from its mission, which is to eradicate protectionism.
193. See GATT, supra note 1, art. XX headnote. This applies to measures that violate
Article XI or III. Any de jure discrimination would be a violation of Article III.
194. It is interesting to note that in the Dolphin II case, the European Union argued
that the GATT already predicated its Article XX discipline on what a reasonable
defendant government could do. See Dolphin II Report, supra note 70, para. 3.73.
195. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(B) (1988).
196. See Dolphin I Repor4 supra note 67, paras. 5.16, 5.29.
197. Id. paras. 5.23, 5.29.
198. Of course, a GATr panel would have to determine that the end being pursued
was covered under GATT Article XX. If a country tried to ban imports to protect local
culture, the panel could declare that this purpose was not covered by Article XX.
199. See Charnovitz, supra note 164, at 215 (distinguishing "relative" from "absolute"
proportionality tests).
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Certainly, trade would be easier if countries adhered to similar stan-
dards. But the proper path to that is negotiated harmonization, not adju-
dication. 20 0 The Uruguay Round moves in this direction by committing
parties to basing their SPS measures on international standards.20 1 Many
commentators have focused on whether the GATT will impose downward
harmonization, 20 2 but it will also be interesting to see if the new Commit-
tee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures fulfils the opposite function-
that is, monitoring whether low-standard countries raise their standards to
international levels.
2 03
There is no doubt that the world would be a better place if countries
did not enact unnecessary or inefficient laws. Yet it is a giant leap to the
conclusion that we ought to authorize GATT panels to dictate changes in
unwise environmental measures. Given that the author is American and
that most GAT] environmental complaints are against the United States,
this statement may seem self-serving. But meddlesome GATT panels are
not that much of a threat to the United States, which still has the eco-
nomic and political power to ignore them. Their real threat is to smaller
countries that may feel great pressure to implement an adverse GATT
panel ruling.
In summary, the GATT should police environmental measures for
hidden protectionism, but it should not decide whether such measures are
sensible on economic or environmental grounds. Nevertheless, it may be
appropriate to set up a mechanism for GATT panels to offer advisory opin-
ions.20 4 For example, a GAT panel might opine that the dolphin safety
standard being imposed by the United States is too rigorous. Mexico
could use that advisory opinion in negotiating with the United States or in
pursuing arbitration. But there would be no GATI obligation that the
United States change its law or accept retaliation by Mexico.
F. Science and Values
It is sometimes suggested that the trading system needs to separate true
200. The first step to such harmonization might be to set minimum and maximum
standards. See Steve Charnovitz, Environmental Harmonization and Trade Policy, in TRADE
AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 4, at 283.
201. SPS Agreement, supra note 140, arts. 3(1), 3(3) (paras. 9, 11). The European
Commission has already complained that certain U.S. sanitary standards for meat are"an unjustified restriction on trade" because they go beyond the recommendations of
the International Office of Epizootics. See 1994 REPORT ON U.S. BARMERSTo TRADE AND
INvsTmENT 78, Doc. No. 1/194/94 (Services of the European Commission ed., 1994).
202. Robert E. Hudec noted: "An international negotiation that goes after the bad
laws cannot help but expose the good laws to downward pressure as well." See Robert E.
Hudec, "Circumventing"Democracy: The Political Morality of Trade Negotiations, 25 N.Y.U.J.
INT'L L. & POL. 311, 320 (1993).
203. SPS Agreement supra note 140, arts. 10, 12(1) (paras. 31-34, 38).
204. This would be a different mechanism than the current GATT panel process and
the new process in the Uruguay Round. It is interesting to note that the Office of the
U.S. Trade Representative characterizes anticipated SPS panel reports as advisory only.
See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATrvE, Ti GATE URUGUAY ROUND ArRF.-
MENTs: REPORT ON ENVIRONMENTAL IssuEs 49 (1994).
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environmental issues from governmental choices reflecting values.205
From this perspective, an environmental issue is something dictated by
science,20 6 like the preservation of a species. Values, by contrast, are not
based on science. They are based on moral concerns 20 7 or emotions (for
example, for marine mammalg).208 Trade measures should be available
for the former, but not the latter, it is said.
This view seems ill-considered. A desire to save a cetacean species
from extinction is based on a value judgment that the species should be
saved. Science does not supply values, and therefore it cannot tell us what
species to save. 20 9 There may be medical or religious reasons to safeguard
cetaceans but not scientific ones.
A desire to save a particular cetacean is also based on values. This
value may be less widely shared than the value of saving a cetacean as a
species, but they are both still values. Science can perhaps tell us with
some range of confidence whether killing x cetaceans will threaten the
species or severely deplete its population, but science offers no guidance
on whether a cetacean, as an individual, should be saved.
If the value endorsed by the GATT was to preserve all species, then
science could be used by a GATT panel. For example, the spotted dolphin
population has been depleted to twenty-three percent of its original
size.2 10 If tuna fishing by Mexico were known to kill numerous spotted
dolphins, a panel might be able to make a judgment that the value of
preserving the spotted dolphin species was being threatened.
As it is, the GATT has not endorsed the value of saving all species.
Consequently, both Mexico and the United States could bring totally dif-
ferent values into dispute settlement. For example, Mexico might not care
205. See, e.g., The Greening of Protectionism, 27 ECONoMIsr, Feb. 27, 1993, at 25 ("[N]ice
as dolphins may be, is killing them an environmental issue?"). This commentator does
not know whether dolphin killing is an environmental issue, but he believes it is cov-
ered by GATT Article XX(b), which includes the protection of animal life. See also Esrv,
supra note 4, at 118-20.
206. For a discussion of the meaning and implications of ecology, see ANNA BRAM-
WELL, ECOLOGY IN THE 20m CENTURY (1989).
207. During the dispute on fur seals of 1890, U.S. Secretary of State Blaine wrote that
the harvesting of the fur seals was so destructive as to be contra bonos mores (i.e., against
good public morals). See THOMAS A. BAILEY, A DIPLOMATIC HisTORY OF THE AMERICAN
PEOPLE 412 (8th ed. 1969).
208. For example, in 1993, some members of the British Parliament urged a ban on
imports of foie gras because it was a "loathsome" product. They noted that national
laws ban force feeding of ducks and geese yet permit imports of foie gras from France.
Laborites Brand Pate A "Loathsome Product", J. CoM., Dec. 6, 1993, at 5A.
209. Science does tell us that humans need to eat organic material to survive. Never-
theless that alone is not an argument for eating whales. However, some Norweigan
officials argue that catching fish and marine mammals may be the most environmen-
tally sound way of producing food for human consumption. See Clay Eric Hawes, Note,
Norwegian Whaling and the Pelly Amendment: A Misguided Attempt at Conservation, 3 MINN.
J. GLOBAL TRADE 97 (1994).
210. Taking and Importing of Marine Mammals: Listing of the Northeastern Off-
shore Spotted Dolphins as Depleted, 58 Fed. Reg. 58,285 (1993). The spinner dolphin
population is 44% of its original size. See Taking and Importing of Marine Mammals:
Listing of the Eastern Spinner Dolphin as Depleted, 58 Fed. Reg. 45,066 (1993).
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whether the dolphin became extinct. The United States might not want to
kill any dolphins. Thus, the application of science by the panel might be
of little help to either country because they do not share the same
values.
2 11
It is not the case that all countries share the value of preserving all
species.21 2 About 140 species (mainly insects) become extinct every
day.213 Certainly the existence of and broad membership in the Conven-
tion on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora (CITES) 214 shows that there is widespread interest in saving endan-
gered species. But if all countries adhered to this goal, trade controls
would not be needed. CITES came into being and is applied to non-par-
ties because some countries were (and still are) willing to permit harvest-
ing of such species. It should also be noted that CITES has no rules
against harvesting per se.
Trade measures have long been used to pursue goals not involving
the survival of a species. For example, import and export bans are used
for sanitary reasons to maintain herds or crops. New Zealand bans
driftnet-caught fish, although it allows the same fish to be imported if
caught with a regular neL21 5 The European Union has enacted a ban on
fur caught in countries that allow leg-hold traps.216 The International
Convention Concerning the Transit of Animals of 1938 commits export-
ing nations to "see [ing] that the animals are properly loaded and suitably
fed and that they receive all necessary attention, in order to avoid unneces-
sary suffering." 217 Under the U.S. Marine Mammal Protection Act, it is
illegal to import a marine mammal "taken in a manner deemed
inhumane."
2 18
None of these measures are aimed at the survival of a species.
Indeed, none of them are aimed at the survival of individual animals.
They do not question the taking of the animal, only the manner that is
treated in harvesting or transportation. As Robert F. Housman has
211. For a discussion of "preservationism," see Anthony D'Amato & Sudhir K.
Chopra, Whales: Their Emerging Right to Life, 85 AM.J. INT'L L. 21, 45-49 (1991).
212. CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, THE GNAT Is OLDER THAN MAN: GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT
AND HuMAN AGENDA 110-11 (1993).
213. EsT,, supra note 4, at 18 (citing Harvard biologist Edward 0. Wilson).
214. Convention of International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 93 U.N.T.S. 243 (1976) [hereinafter CITES].
215. See Act to Prohibit Driftnet Fishing Activities and to Implement the Convention
for the Prohibition of Fishing with Long Driftnets in the South Pacific, Apr. 14, 1991, 31
I.L.M. 218 § 8 (1992). Driftnets have been banned because they cause indiscriminate
damage to the marine environment. Thus, indiscriminate, unnecessary killing is viewed
differently from killing an animal to eat it.
216. For a discussion of this ban and of the Clinton Administration's concerns over
the matter, see OFFicE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 1993 NATIONAL TRADE Esn-
MATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 82-83 (1993). See alsoJohn Maggs, U.S. to
Protest EUFur Ban Involving Use of Leg-Hold TrapsJ. CoM., June 22, 1994, at 3A (noting
complaint by U.S. officials that the ban is merely intended to reduce the suffering of
wildlife rather than preserve a species).
217. Dec. 6, 1938, art. 5, 193 L.N.T.S. 39, 45.
218. 16 U.S.C. § 1372(b)(4) (1988).
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pointed out, it is quite consistent with the Western philosophical tradition
for societies to make value judgments of this sort.
2 19
It might be noted that GATT Article XX(b) is not narrowly based.
The exception applies not only to species preservation but also to animal
life or health. Thus, if one interprets the term "environment" as applying
just to species preservation, 220 then the GATT's Article XX(b) and (g)
exceptions are broader than the environment.
GATT panels considering SPS cases can make good use of scientific
input. 22 ' Nevertheless, that input may not be dispositive. Although sci-
ence can provide an estimate of the risk from a substance, it cannot tell
the panel whether a country should bear (or should want to bear) that
risk.
If a country believes that any risk of cancer is too great, then such a
standard should survive scrutiny under the Uruguay Round SPS Agree-
ment, which purports not to supervise a country's level of protection. 2 22 A
more difficult case will occur when, notwithstanding a risk that is
extremely small or zero, a country wants to ban a substance anyway. For
example, a country may not want any artificial hormones in meat. Trade
conflicts will occur when countries that put hormones in meat want to
penetrate foreign markets with exports.
In theory, scientific studies could be used to show whether such a ban
is necessary.223 However, the GATT should be very careful in going down
that road, because the use of science in judicial review is a rapidly evolving
field 2 24 -one that ad hoc GATT panels would seem ill-equipped to han-
dle. Of course, if a country banned the importation of meat with hor-
mones but still iolerated the use of hormones domestically (even though
officially banned), that should be considered arbitrary discrimination.
Science can also be useful in conservation cases. If nations agreed
that sustainable harvests should be permitted, such as for whales, then the
GATT could examine an import restriction to see if it is restrictive of prac-
tices that are consistent with a sustainable harvest. But if the nation with
the trade restriction does not accept the concept of a sustainable harvest,
219. Robert F. Housman, A Kantian Approach to Trade and the Environment, 49 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. 1373, 1388 (1992).
220. This is a very narrow view of the animal environment. It is inconsistent with the
use of the term regarding humans, as environmentalists are concerned with many issues
that do not involve the destruction of humanity.
221. See The Role of Science in Adjudicating Trade Disputes Under the North American Free
Trade Agreement: Hearing Before the Committee on Science, Space and Technology, U.S. House of
Representatives, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 159 (1992).
222. SPSAgreement supra note 140, arts. 3-5 (paras. 11-21). Nevertheless, article 5(5)
(para. 20) does require internal consistency in the level of protection.
223. The idea of using science to resolve sanitary trade disputes has been discussed
frequently. See, e.g., COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO NATIONAL POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIc RELATIONS, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIc RELATIONS: REPORT OF THE COMMIS.
SION 85-86 (1934).
224. See Steven G. Gallagher & Jeffrey I. Butvinik, Judges as Gatekeepers, ENVTL. F.,
Jan./Feb. 1994, at 14; see also George J. Annas, Scientific Evidence in the Courtroom-The
Death of the Fiye Rule; 330 NEw ENG.J. MED. 1018 (1994).
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then scientific considerations cannot show that an import restriction is
unnecessary.
225
While science cannot dictate a value, it can be used to determine
whether the same value can be achieved by alternative methods. U.S. law
now prohibits the sale or shipment of tuna that is not caught in a
"dolphin-safe" way.2 26 This provision applies to fish from U.S. and foreign
fishermen. The law has several criteria for determining when tuna are to
be considered dolphin-safe, but the main requirement is that the ship-
ment be accompanied by certifications from the vessel's captain and an
official observer that "no purse seine net was intentionally deployed on or
to encircle dolphins during the particular voyage on which the tuna was
harvested."
22 7
Suppose that the United States bans tuna from Panama, who then
complains to the GATT. Suppose further that Panama argues that its fish-
ermen use such skillful techniques that they can deploy purse seine nets
without hurting dolphins. If Panama argues that its techniques lead to a
high level of serenity for the dolphin even though they do not meet the
U.S. standard, the panel could make a judgment on that point based on
the testimony of the observers and other experts. The issue before the
panel would be a scientific one: whether the Panamanian process meth-
ods are equivalent in result to the U.S. methods.
The fishing industry has argued that with current techniques, sets on
dolphins can be done without high mortality.228 Indeed, if fishermen do
not set on dolphins, the alternative methods may be more lethal to sharks,
rays, and other fish.229 According to experts at the Inter-American Tropi-
cal Tuna Commission, the alternative methods can also lead to undesir-
able trapping of baby tuna that are discarded and wasted.230 Thus, a
country that used fishing methods that met the U.S. goal of dolphin-safety
would have a good case that a U.S. standard requiring a particular harvest-
ing practice violates the GATr. This is a different objection from the one
put forward by the GATT Dolphin panel, namely that the United States
must accept imported tuna "whether or not the incidental taking of dol-
phins by Mexican vessels corresponds to that of United States vessels."
23 '
The panel was generally viewed as suggesting that GATT rules cannot take
into account whether dolphins were killed or not.
In summary, many trade/environment conflicts arise from differ-
ences in values. Such conflicts cannot be refereed by science or defined
away by saying that they are motivated by moral rather than environmental
225. For further discussion, see Ethan Mollick, Whale of a Dilemma: Science, Politics
and the IWC Ban, HARv. INT'L Rnv., Summer 1994, at 58.
226. 16 U.S.C. § 1417 (Supp. V 1993).
227. 16 U.S.C. § 1417(d)(4) (Supp. V 1993).
228. See Pacific Tuna Fishermen Take on Greenpeace, EIR SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY, Oct. 1,
1993, at 18, 20.
229. Brad Warren, The Downside of Dolphin Safe AUDUBON, Nov.-Dec. 1993, at 20.
230. (U.S.) MAMNE MAMMAL COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 121-23 (1993)
[hereinafter MARINE MAMMAL COMMISSION REPORT].
231. Dolphin I Report, supra note 67, para. 5.15.
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concerns. 23 2 As the Clinton Administration's environmental review of
NAFTA correctly pointed out, "the choice of the appropriate level of pro-
tection is a social valuejudgment. There is no requirement for a scientific
basis for the level of protection, because it is not a scientific judgment."
233
G. Eco-Imperialism
It is sometimes suggested that international trade rules prevent nations
from implementing import restrictions based on the policies or practices
in the country of production.23 4 Arthur Dunkel, as GATr Director Gen-
eral, expressed concern that nations were trying "to impose domestic envi-
ronmental or labour standards on other countries through trade measures
. *."..235 Many commentators have characterized such unilateral environ-
mental trade measures as "eco-imperialism." 236 Deepak Lal, alluding to
Kipling, sees a "green variant of the nineteenth-century's white-man's bur-
den ...."257
These concerns are exaggerated. First, enacting environmental regu-
lations is not imperialism (although it may constitute paternalism). Impe-
rialism is dependent on the use of force or coercion.
23 8
Second, the setting of environmental product or process standards
does not impose anything on a foreign producer.23 9 For example, New
York prohibits the sale of any live bird not born and raised in captivity.2 40
Such a standard is not imperialism. 24 ' The producer may adapt to meet
the buyer's specifications or sell to someone else.
Third, in many cases, the motivation for environmental trade meas-
ures has not been the "export" of values. Rather, it has been the recogni-
tion that foreign conservation practices can affect one's own
environment. 242 Another motivation is to avoid purchasing products
232. See generally MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH: PHILOsOPHY, LAW, AND
THE ENVIRONMENT ch. 4-5 (1988).
233. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, THE NAFTA: EXPANDING U.S.
EXPORTS,JoBs AND GROw'H: REPORT ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES 8 (1993). The point is
made with respect to sanitary measures but has broader application.
234. GATT SECRETARIAT, supra note 12, at 23.
235. Dunkel Warns on Protectionism, FIN. TIMES, May 24, 1993, at 6.
236. For example, see Gijs M. DeVries, How to Banish Eco-ImperialismJ. COM., Apr. 30,
1992, at 8A. See also Christopher Chivvis, A Troublesome Attack on GA7T, J. COM., Mar. 1,
1994, at 8A.
237. Deepak Lal, Trade Blocs and Multilateral Free Trade, 31 J. COMMON MARKET STUD.
356-57 (1993).
238. See NEw PALGRAvE DICIONARY OF ECONOMICs 728 (John Eatwell et al. eds.,
1987).
239. Janet McDonald, Greening the GATT. Harmonizing Free Trade and Environmental
Protection in the New World Order, 23 ENvTL. L. 397, 432-33 (1993).
240. N.Y. ENvrL. CONsERv. LAw § 11-1728 (McKinney 1994).
241. See WILLIAM DIEBOLD, JR., INDuSTRAL POLICY AS AN INTERNATIONAL ISSUE 241
(1980) ("A country that bans certain products as noxious can hardly be thought to
throw a serious burden on the rest of the world because it refuses to import these
substances.").
242. As Lynton K. Caldwell points out, "as ecological interrelationships are better
understood... peoples will increasingly become aware that they may be suffering envi-
ronmental damage originating on the territory of other nations...." Lynton K. Cald-
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whose production has bad environmental side effects.
Fourth, a "free trade" philosophy does not imply a tolerance for kill-
ing animals (e.g., tiger hunting). A libertarian might argue that the gov-
ernment should not interfere with voluntary transactions among humans,
but tigers in no way consent to being hunted. Thus, paternalism about the
treatment of animals (particularly when the animals, such as whales, reside
in the global commons) is on firmer philosophical ground than paternal-
ism about the pollution control or occupational health laws chosen in for-
eign countries.
Actually, the real danger of eco-imperialism comes not from passive
unilateral trade measures but from World Trade Organization (WTO) dis-
pute settlement.243 Under the new SPS agreement, a WTO panel would
be able to rule against a health requirement. 244 If the defending country
refuses to change its health law as it applies to imports, the WTO would
permit the complaining country to levy trade sanctions against such coun-
try.245 Such sanctions would be active measures aimed solely at forcing
the other country to change its law.
H. Unilateralism
More serious than eco-imperialism is the concern that unilateral measures
may be used in place of multilateral ones or that unilateral actions may
impede multilateral cooperation. Although this is theoretically possible, a
review of past practice indicates that unilateralism has been rather a criti-
cal step for securing multilateralism. Indeed, one could offer a hypothesis
that unilateralism may be a precondition for multilateralism.
246
Many of the most important health and environmental treaties were
preceded by unilateral trade measures. 247 For example, the International
well, Concepts in Development of International Environmental Policies, in INT'L UNION FOR
CONSERVATION OF NATURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES (IUCN), TWELF TECHNICAL
MEETING, PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS 98 (No. 28, 1972).
243. See Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, GATT Doc. MTN/FA II
(Dec. 15, 1993) [hereinafter World Trade Organization], in Uruguay Round, supra note 49.
The World Trade Organization is a successor organization to the Interim Commission
for the International Trade Organization. The GATT itself has no legal institutional
basis. Once the Uruguay Round agreements are approved by a sufficient number of
countries, the GATT will become one of many agreements administered by the WTO.
244. SPS Agreemen supra note 140, art. 11(1) (para. 35).
245. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, supra
note 173, § 22.
246. As Bilder notes, the choice is often not unilateralism versus multilateralism, but
rather unilateralism versus inaction. This article presents a very thoughtful, conceptual,
and empirical treatment of the role of unilateralism in environmental policy. See Rich-
ard B. Bilder, The Role of Unilateral State Action in Preventing International Environmental
Injury, 14 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 51 (1981).
247. The same pattern occurred in the outlawing of the slave trade. Several nations
such as Denmark in 1804, Great Britain in 1807 (47 Geo. 3, ch. 36 (Eng.)), and the
United States in 1808 (2 Stat. 426 (1807)), banned the importation of slaves before
slavery itself was abolished in 1848, 1833, and 1865 respectively. See 21 CoLuER's ENCY-
CLOPEDA, 75 (1993); ENcYCLoPED A AMEacAuN 24 (Int'l ed. 1990). These unilateral
import bans also preceded international treaties to ban the slave trade in the late 19th
century and early 20th century. See Treaty Between Great Britain, Austria, France, Prus-
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Sanitary Conventions of the nineteenth century were in part motivated by
tight quarantines and transportation restrictions.248 While the U.S. legis-
lation of 1897 to ban pelagic sealing and seal skin imports249 was ineffec-
tive as a unilateral measure,250 it served as a model for the Fur Seals
Convention of 1911,251 which was successful in saving the fur seal.
25 2
Although the International Union for the Conservation of Nature
began to discuss the need for an international treaty on endangered spe-
cies in the early 1960s, it was recognized that national import restrictions
were the most realistic first step.253 The United Kingdom passed the first
such law in 1964,254 and the United States followed in 1969.255 The U.S.
law also called upon the Secretary of the Interior to seek an international
meeting to agree on a binding treaty regarding endangered species.
25 6
This meeting, held in Washington in 1973, produced CITES.
25 7
Even with this international agreement, national action can be useful
in spurring CITES to act. For example, because of concerns about the
destruction of African elephants, many countries began to ban certain
ivory imports. The United States acted first with the African Elephant
Conservation Act of 1988,258 and the United Kingdom, the Netherlands,
Germany, the European Community, and Japan followed in 1989.259
Later that year, CITES finally banned all international commercial traffic
sia, and Russia, for the Suppression of the African Slave Trade, Dec. 20, 1841, 30
B.F.S.P. 269, 298; Treaty Between Great Britain and Spain for the Suppression of the
African Slave Trade, July 2, 1890, Gr.Brit.-Spain, 173 Consol. T.S. 285-292; Slavery Con-
vention, Sept. 25, 1926, 60 L.N.T.S. 253, 256.
248. See Richard N. Cooper, International Cooperation in Public Health as Prologue to
Macroeconomic Cooperation, in CAN NATIONS AGREE? 193, 210 (Richard N. Cooper et al.
edi., 1989).
249. Act of Dec. 29, 1897, ch. 3, 30 Stat. 226, 227.
250. The potential ineffectiveness was recognized, but the measure was enacted as an
expression of good faith. See The Fur Seals Convention, H.R. REP. No. 295, 62d Cong., 2d
Sess. 6 (1897).
251. Convention Between Great Britain, Japan, Russia, and the United States
Respecting Measures for the Preservation and Protection of Fur Seals in the North
Pacific Ocean, Dec. 12, 1911, art. I, III, 214 Consol. T.S. 80 [hereinafter Fur Seals Con-
vention of 1911]. Article I bans pelagic sealing and Article III bans the landing of
sealskins unlawfully taken.
252. SHERMAN STRONG HAYDEN, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF WILDUFE 131
(1942).
253. ROBERT BOARDmAN, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND THE CONSERVATION OF
NATURE 88-90 (1981).
254. Animals (Restriction of Importation) Act, 1964, ch. 61 (Eng.) (repealed).
255. Pub. L. No. 91-135, § 2, 83 Stat. 275 (1969).
256. Pub. L. No. 91-135, § 5(b), 83 Stat. 275, 278 (1969). The intended purpose of
the treaty, according to Congress, was to "assure the worldwide conservation of endan-
gered species and to prevent competitive harm to affected United States industries
. I.." /d
257. CITES, supra note 214.
258. 16 U.S.C. §§ 4201-4205 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
259. Meena Alagappan, Comment, The United Stateas'Enforcement of the Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 10 Nw.J. INT'L L. & Bus.
541,543 (1990); L Ludwig Krfimer, Environmental Protection and Article 30EEC Treaty, 30
COMMON MKr. L. REV., 111, 137 n.81 (1993).
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in ivory.260
The United States and the European Union maintain separate endan-
gered species registers that permit them to enact stronger controls than
CITES.26 1 Since CITES requires a two-thirds vote to grant protection to a
species,2 62 the possibility always exists that biological considerations may
be overridden by international politics. The ability of nations (particularly
large nations) to backstop CITES by being more strict may help prevent
political squabbles in the CITES listing process.
In recent years, unilateral trade measures have preceded interna-
tional environmental agreements in areas such as whaling, hazardous
waste, and driftnet fishing. For example, in 1981, the European Commu-
nity banned the importation of whale products for commercial pur-
poses.263 In 1982, the International Whaling Commission voted to ban
commercial whaling.2 64 In 1983, CITES added seven more species of
whales to Appendix I, thus banning commercial trade in those species.2 65
In 1984, the U.S. Congress prohibited the exportation of hazardous
waste without the consent of the importing country.266 Two years later,
the European Community passed a similar directive. 26 7 In 1988, the Eco-
nomic Community of West African States agreed to enact criminal laws
regarding the importation of hazardous waste.268 It is unclear whether
these measures were important factors leading to the consummation of
the Basel Convention in the following year,26 9 but it seems plausible that
the willingness of nations to act alone stimulated international agreement.
In 1989, the U.N. General Assembly approved a resolution on large-
scale pelagic driftnet fishing that recommended, but did not require, a
cessation of such fishing in the South Pacific byJuly 1, 1991.270 To pro-
mote this goal, the U.S. Congress banned the importation of fish caught
using a driftnet after that date2 71 and authorized trade sanctions against
260. Jane Perlez, Global Trade in Ivor is Banned to Protect the African Elephant, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 17, 1989, at C13.
261. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); EC Regulation 3626/82, 1982 O.J.
(L 384) 1.
262. CITES, supra note 214, art. XV(1) (b).
263. Council Regulation 348/81, 1981 O.J. (L 39) 1.
264. Paul Demaret, Environmental Policy and Commercial Policy: The Emergence of Trade-
Related Environmental Measures (TREMs) in the External Relations of the European Community,
in THE EUROPEAN CoMMuNrrY's COMMERcIAL PoLicY AsrER 1992: THE LEGAL DIMENSION
305, 326 (Marc Maresceau ed., 1993).
265. D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 211, at 47.
266. 42 U.S.C. § 6938 (1988).
267. Council Directive 86/279, 1986 O.J. (L 181) 13.
268. Barbara D. Huntoon, Emerging Controls on Transfer of Hazardous Waste to Develop-
ing Countries, 21 LAw & PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 247, 250 (1989). See also Mark A. Montgomery,
Traveling Toxic Trash: An Analysis of the 1989 Basel Convention, 14 Fi.ETrCHER F. WoRLD
AFr. 313, 326 (1990) (noting that 40 countries had already instituted a ban of trans-
boundary movements of hazardous waste by March 1989).
269. Final Act and Text of Basel Convention, 28 I.L.M. 649 (1989).
270. G.A. Res. 225, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., 85th plen. mtg., Supp. No. 49, at 147,
para. 4b, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/225 (1989) [hereinafter Resolution 225].
271. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a) (2) (E) (i) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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nations that continued certain types of driftnet fishing.27 2 These actions,
including a threat of U.S. trade sanctions under the Pelly amendment,
2 73
seemed to play a role274 in gaining the acquiescence ofJapan, Korea, and
Taiwan to a more definitive U.N. Resolution calling for a global morato-
rium on large-scale driftnet fishing by the end of 1992.275
The killing of dolphins in tuna fishing has now been drastically
reduced. 276 According to the U.S. Marine Mammal Commission, this
reduction resulted from the U.S. import bans, the decision of major tuna
canneries in 1990 to buy only dolphin-safe tuna, and the multilateral
efforts taken by the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission. 277 In
1992, the Tuna Commission adopted a regulatory program that provided
a dolphin kill quota for each year and apportioned it to each fishing ves-
sel.278 It is possible that this program would have been agreed to without
the U.S. import ban but that seems unlikely.
2 79
Even when unilateral action does not engender multilateral agree-
ments, it may be constructive in promoting other unilateral action. For
example, in 1908, the British Parliament considered a law to ban the sale
of imported birds or their plumage.280 This bill was objected to, and did
not pass, because other countries would have continued to import such
birds.28 ' But in commenting on the attempt, one supporter pointed out
that "[r]epresentations to foreign countries are much more likely to be
effectual if made by a Government which has had the courage of its con-
victions, and has already put its principles into practice."28 2 Two years
later, Australia banned such imports.283 The United States and Canada
272. 16 U.S.C. § 1826(f) (Supp. V 1993).
273. The U.S. Pelly amendment is a 1971 law authorizing the President to impose
sanctions against countries who permit their nationals to diminish the effectiveness of
an environmental treaty. See 22 U.S.C. § 1978 (1988). For a discussion of the history
and use of the Pelly amendment, see Steve Charnovitz, Environmental Trade Sanctions
and the GATT. An Analysis of the Petty Amendment on Foreign Environmental Practices, 9 Am.
U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 751 (1994).
274. See, e.g., Tom Kenworthy, Japan to End Drift Net Fishing In Bow to Worldwide Pres-
sure, WASH. POST, Nov. 27, 1991, at A3; Jessica Mathews, State of the Planet, WASH. POST,
Jan. 2, 1992, at A23.
275. Large-Scale Palagic Dnift-Net Fihing and Its Impact on the Living Marine Resources of
the World's Oceans and Seas, GA. Res. 215, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., at 147, para. 3(c),
U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/215 (1992).
276. In 1972, when the Marine Mammal Protection Act was enacted, U.S. vessels
killed 368,600 dolphins and foreign vessels killed 55,078. See MARINE MAMMAL COMMIS.
SION REPORT, supra note 230, at 116. In 1993, U.S. fishing vessels killed 115 dolphins
while foreign vessels killed about 3,900. See id. at 117.
277. Id. at 115.
278. Id. at 121-22.
279. Wirth, supra note 61, at 1398.
280. A. HOLTE MACPHERSON, COMPARATIVE LEGISLATION FOR THE PROTECTION OF
BIRDS 28 (1909).
281. Id.
282. Id. at 29.
283. Proclamation, 20 Gaz. 882 (1911) (Austl.).
Vol 27
1994 Free Trade, Fair Trade, Green Trade
soon followed. 28 4 Great Britain finally acted in 1921.285
During the 1930s, trade measures were instrumental in saving certain
quails from extinction. Egypt passed a law to ban the export of live quail;
Great Britain supported this action with a law banning the importation of
quail in 1937.286 France acted in the same year to ban the importation of
quail.
287
In the early 1980s, Italy and the Netherlands banned the importation
of products derived from baby seals that were being killed off of the Cana-
dian coast.288 Partly because of these unilateral actions, the European
Commission approved a directive to forbid the importation of seal pups
and related products.2 89 This directive was intended to convince Canada
to cease commercial hunting of seal pups.
290
Although some commentators might view trade measures imposed
pursuant to any treaty as non-unilateral, whenever such measures are
imposed on a non-party, that country is likely to view the measure as uni-
lateral.2 9 1 The application of environmental treaties to non-parties has
been an important element in the success of many treaties. For example,
the Fur Seals Convention of 1911292 permitted importation of seal skins
only from parties (when lawfully taken).293 This provision may have pre-
vented the reflagging of fishing ships.2 94 CITES also requires the imposi-
tion of the same rules to non-parties,29 5 which may be one reason why
CITES has so many parties.2 96 There is no advantage in staying out.
Moreover, by joining, parties can participate in CITES decision-making.
Those who argue against unilateral environmental trade measures
must take one of two positions. The first is that no trade measure should
be applied on a non-consensual basis. The second is that trade measures
can be applied non-consensually only if 1 + N countries agree. The first
position would be a formula for gridlock. The second position is worka-
284. Pub. L. No. 16, § 347,38 Stat. 114, 148 (1913); Customs Tariff, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo.
5, ch. 26, § 5 (Eng.). See generaUy ROBIN W. DoucmHv, FEATHER FASHIONS AND BIRD PRES-
ERVATION (1975).
285. Act to Consolidate the Customs Laws, 1876, 39 & 40 Vict., ch. 36 (Eng.).
286. Jean Delacour, On the Conservation of Bird Resources, in VII PROCEEDINGS OF THE
UNITED NATIONS SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE ON THE CONSERVATION AND UTILIZATION OF
REsOURCEs 228.29 (1951). The conference was held in 1949, shortly after the writing of
the ITO charter. The timing is significant because some commentators have doubted
that the international community was aware at the time the GAIT was written that trade
measures might be used to protect the natural resources of other countries.
287. Id.
288. Demaret, supra note 264, at 328 n.57.
289. Council Directive 83/129, 1983 O.j. (L 91) 30.
290. Demaret, supra note 264, at 329.
291. See Steve Charnovitz, A Taxonomy of Environmental Trade Measures, 6 GEO. INT'L
ENvTIr L. REv. 1, 7 (1993).
292. See Fur Seals Convention of 1911, supra note 251.
293. Id. art. III.
294. HAYDEN, supra note 252, at 127-28.
295. CITES, supra note 214, art. X.
296. John Temple Lang, Commentary, in ENVRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw 179, 183 (Winfried Lang et al. eds., 1991).
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ble, but has the same problems of GATE legality and "eco-imperialism"
2 97
as single-nation unilateralism. Given the recent history of voluntary
export restraints and the longtime managed trade regime on textiles and
apparel,2 98 one would have difficulty arguing that a requirement for col-
lective action mitigates against the danger of protectionism. There would
also be the problem of determining the right value for N. Whatever
number is chosen, there would surely be heavy dickering at N-2.
In reviewing the history of environmental cooperation, there clearly
has been a fruitful interplay between unilateral and multilateral action.
2 99
There could be danger in giving up such options.3 0 0 As Jessica Mathews
has noted, "Outlawing such [unilateral] steps would harness the pace of
international progress to that of the slowest marcher."3 01 Some commen-
tators object to unilateralism on the grounds that only large nations can
act unilaterally. But that manifestation of largeness is not necessarily bad.
Large nations may feel a greater responsibility to prevent the consumption
of goods causing environmental damage than might smaller nations.
I. Border Tax Adjustments
The issue of border tax adjustments is a central one for trade policy.
902 It
has received less attention than it deserves, perhaps because of its com-
plexity.3 03 This section seeks to introduce the issue in the context of the
trade and environment debate.
The purpose of a border tax adjustment is to load an internal tax
onto an imported product or to unload an internal tax from an exported
product. The motivation in both instances is commercial parity, i.e., to
provide a "level playing field."30 4 For example, imported products would
have an advantage in domestic markets if a domestic sales tax were not
297. This is a fairly new term, with pejorative connotations, meant to describe envi-
ronmental trade measures aimed at least partly at changing environmental policies in
other countries.
298. See generally WILLIAM R. CLINE, INST. FOR INT'L ECON., THE FurruR OF WORLD
TRADE IN TEXTILEs AND APPARE. (1990).
299. Harold K. Jacobson & David A. Kay, Conclusions and Poliry, in ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION: THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION 325 (Harold K. Jacobson & David A. Kay
eds., 1983) ("By taking or just threatening unilateral action [, the United States] has
prodded the reluctant to act."). See also Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Precaution, Participation,
and the "Greening" of International Trade Law, 7J. EN'vL. L. & Lrrx. 57, 85 (1992).
300. Carol J. Beyers, The U.S./Mexico Tuna Embargo Dispute: A Case Study of the GAIT
and Environmental Progress, 16 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 229, 248 (1992) ("[A] country
must be able to act unilaterally when progressive multilateral agreements are simply not
viable.").
301. Jessica Mathews, The Great Greenless GATT, WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 1994, at A19.
302. For further discussion, see GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER &JOANNA SHELTON ERn, SuB-
SIDIES IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 51-57 (1984).
303. See generally Paul Demaret & Raoul Stewardson, Border Tax Adjustments Under
GATT and EC Law and General Implications for Environmental TaxesJ. WORLD TRADE, Aug.
1994, at 5.
304. The GATT permits other tax adjustments under Article VI, known as counter-
vailing and anti-dumping duties. These are not border adjustments but rather discrimi-
natory penalties on foreign imports. They do not purport to mirror domestic taxes.
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applied.30 5 Similarly, exported products could be disadvantaged in for-
eign markets if they carried sales taxes.
If all countries levied identical taxes at identical rates, the border tax
adjustment problem would be enormously simplified. One would need
only a consistent rule on imports and exports, and no traded products
would be disadvantaged by the tax. However, countries do not maintain
similar tax systems.
Producers are mercantilist. Therefore, they prefer to unload all inter-
nal taxes from exported products and to load as many internal taxes as
possible on competing imported products. Since governments often
demonstrate mercantilist values, there have been laws on border tax
adjustments for hundreds of years.
30 6
Given these inconsistent laws and practices, the GATT tries to create
some order.30 7 Its rule comes in three parts. First, GATT Article 111:2
states that: "The products of the territory of any contracting party
imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall not be sub-
ject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of any
kind in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic
products .... ,,308
Second, GAIT Article 11:2 states that
Nothing in this Article shall prevent any contracting party from imposing at
any time on the importation of any product: (a) a charge equivalent to an
internal tax imposed consistently with the provisions of paragraph 2 of Arti-
cle III in respect of the like domestic product or in respect of an article
from which the imported product has been manufactured or produced in
whole or in part... .-09
Third, GATT Article VI:4 states that
No product of the territory of any contracting party imported into the terri-
tory of any other contracting party shall be subject to anti-dumping or coun-
tervailing duty by reason of the exemption of such product from duties or
taxes borne by the like product when destined for consumption in the
country of origin or exportation, or by reason of the refund of such duties
or taxes. 3
10
These rules are not perfectly clear. For example, what does "directly
or indirectly" mean? What does "borne" mean?
305. This refers to a tax on a product being imported by the final user. If an
imported product is sold in a grocery store, the store collects the sales tax as it would on
a domestic product. In that case, customs officials would not impose a border tax
adjustment.
306. See, e.g., Whiskey Act, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 199 (1791).
307. The word "order" is not used to imply that the GAT has a full regime. As
Robert H. Floyd has noted, "[T]here exist no internationally accepted regulations
designed for the treatment in international transactions of domestic tax systems...."
Robert H. Floyd, GAT Provision on Border Tax Adjustments, 7J. WoRub TRADE L. 489,
499 (1973).
308. GATT, supra note 1, art. III, § 2.
309. Id. art. II, § 2.
310. See also id. Ad art. XVI headnote.
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One student of the GATT, Kenneth W. Dam, offers this somewhat
confusing clarification:
[T]he terms "directly" and "indirectly" do not refer to "direct" and "indi-
rect" taxes. On the contrary, a tax applying "directly" to "products" is an
indirect tax, while a tax applying "indirectly" to "products" is a direct tax.
This terminological anomaly can be resolved by switching one's
perspective.
3 "
The concept of "borne" was based on traditional practice and theories
of incidence from public finance.3 12 To wit, sales taxes are borne by the
product, reflected in the price, and paid by the consumer, while corporate
income taxes are not borne by the product, but rather paid by stockhold-
ers. Thus, an export rebate on a sales tax would be allowable, while an
export rebate on an income tax would not be allowable.31 s If a tax is
rebated on exports contrary to these rules, the importing country can
impose a countervailing duty.
3 14
The issue of border taxes becomes significant for the environment
when internal taxes are levied for environmental purposes. For simple
product taxes, these border adjustment rules are relatively straightforward.
For example, if Country A imposes a bottle tax of ten cents per bottle, it
can load the tax on imports from Country B and unload it from exports to
Country C. Country C could not seek to countervail the rebate. Country
B could not complain about the border adjustment. But if Country A pro-
duces cans rather than bottles, Country B might complain that the tax
violates another requirement in Article III-namely, that internal taxes
not be used so as "to afford protection to domestic production."
3 15 If
Country B prevails, then Country A's environmental aims might be
frustrated.
A far greater complication occurs when countries base their internal
taxes not on weight, volume, or value, but on the ingredients used in mak-
ing a product, the performance of the product (e.g., fuel efficiency), or
the method of production. This causes two environmental problems.
One is that the permissibility of border adjustments for certain environ-
mental taxes remains uncertain. The inability to do a border adjustment
may make it harder (for political reasons) to levy the tax in the first place.
The other problem is that unloading such internalization taxes from
exports might be viewed as antithetical to the environment.
Most of the analysis done by the GATT on border taxes involved
efforts by European nations to permit border adjustments on various
forms of turnover and value-added taxes. Unlike sales taxes, which are
levied on the product, value-added taxes reflect taxes levied at each stage
311. KzNNir W. DAM, THE GAT: LAw AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZA-
TION 124 (1970).
312. Id. at 210-16.
313. Id. at 139.
314. GATT, supra note 1, art. VI, § 1.
315. Id. art. III, § 1.
Vol. 27
1994 Free Trade, Fair Trade, Green Trade
of production.3 16 In spite of this "process" component of the tax, Euro-
pean nations won the right to rebate their taxes on export 3 1 7 Thus,
GATT rules are reasonably clear on two points. First, corporate income
taxes do not qualify for border adjustments.3 18 Second, sales taxes and
value-added taxes do qualify.3 19 In addition, the GATT adopted a working
party report in 1960 which stated that "social welfare charges" were not
eligible for an export rebate.3 20 Social welfare charges would include
social security or payroll taxes.
For other excise (or extractive) taxes, GATT rules are not clear.
These are sometimes called "taxes occultes."3 2 ' To make them seem less
sinister, they will be called "factor taxes" here.3 22 Some examples of factor
taxes are taxes on energy, transportation, and equipment used in produc-
tion.3 23 For factor taxes designed to internalize the costs of production, a
good case can be made that such taxes are "borne" by the product. A pure
effluent tax, that is a tax on pollution emitted in production, is not a fac-
tor tax. Pollution is an externality. The legal argument for allowing a
border tax adjustment on a pollution tax may be even stronger than for a
factor tax, because it is generally agreed that taxes on the labor factor
cannot be adjusted.3 24 Pollution might also be viewed as a dis-
316. SeeJOHN H.JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAw OF GATT 298 n.19 (1969); see
also Rob Norton, The Tax Idea That Won't Go Away, FORTUNE, May 17, 1993, at 77 (Value
added taxes are embedded in the prices consumers pay rather than tacked on at the
point of sale.).
317. In the early years of the GATT, its rules evolved in a very Europe-friendly way.
The United States went along to promote the achievement of the Common Market. See
DAM, supra note 311, at 291;JACKSON, supra note 316, at 297-98; see also Pub. L. No. 80-
472, § 102(a), 62 Stat. 137 (1948) ("Mindful of the advantages which the United States
has enjoyed through the existence of a large domestic market with no internal trade
barriers . . . it is declared to be the policy of the people of the United States to
encourage ... economic cooperation in Europe.. ").
318. See DAm, supra note 311, at 211. Reports of Committees and Principal Sub-Committees,
U.N. Conference on Trade and Employment, para. 44, U.N. Doc. ICITO 1/8 (1948).
319. GATT Ad Article XVI permits exemption of exports from taxes that "have
accrued." This embraces turnover taxes, but other taxes may also accrue. GATT, supra
note 1, Ad art. XVI.
320. Subsidies: Provisions of ArtideXVI4, GAIT Doc. L/1381 (Nov. 19, 1960), B.I.S.D.,
supra note 1, 9th Supp. 185, para. 5(c) (1961). This report did not address the border
adjustability of imports.
321. For a good discussion, see Roger W. Rosendahl, Border Tax Adjustments: Problems
and Praposals, LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 85, 113-16 (1970).
322. This term relates to the factors of production, such as labor, capital, land (natu-
ral resources), and management.
323. Factor taxes would also include taxes on materials consumed in the production
process (e.g., catalysts) and thus not incorporated into the final product.
324. See Charles Pearson, Environmental Control Costs and BorderAdjustments, 27 NAT'L
TAxJ. 599, 604 (1974). Pearson notes that
[a] contrary argument could be made persuasively that [an] effluent tax (is]
not a tax, but the pricing of an input into production (environmental services)
which previously had been supplied at less than cost. From that perspective,
the effluent tax would be viewed as simply another payment to a factor of
production.
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incorporated material output, in contradistinction to an non-incorporated
material input like energy.
The rationale for the GATT provision can also be deduced by study-
ing earlier international approaches to the concept of national treatment.
The issue of fiscal charges on imported goods was discussed extensively by
the World Economic Conference of 1927, which recommended "that all
international taxes of consumption, excise, octroi, circulation, manipula-
tion, etc., which are applied to the products of any foreign country should
be applied in the same manner and in the same degree to the products of
all foreign countries and to identical and similar home products." 325 The
aim of this provision was that imported goods "must be regarded as duly
nationalised and should be entitled after their importation to claim equal
treatment with home products."3 26 There was no intent to distinguish
between internal "product" taxes and internal "process" taxes. The pur-
pose of the discipline was to reflag imported products as domestic ones.
Many pre-GATT treaties addressed border adjustments on process
taxes in their provisions on national treatment. For example, the Treaty
of Commerce and Navigation between Italy and the Kingdom of the Serbs,
Croats and Slovenes of 1924 provided that "internal duties in respect of
production, manufacture, or consumption ... may not on any pretext what-
soever be levied on like products coming from the territory of the other
High Contracting Party at a higher rate or in a more burdensome man-
ner."3 27 The French-German Commercial Agreement of 1927 provided
-that
It]he internal duties.., in respect of the production, movement, making-up
or consumption of a natural or manufactured product must not under any
pretext constitute a heavier charge on the products of the other Party or be
composed under more onerous conditions than the internal taxes on like
native products.
328
The Netherlands-United States trade agreement of 1935 required that
internal taxes applied to imports "be not more than fairly equivalent or
compensatory to the internal tax or other exaction imposed on or with
respect to the processing of domestic articles."3 29 In all three cases, the
agreements seem to permit border adjustments on processing as long as
they do not unfairly burden imports. The GATT provisions are less clear,
but there is no evidence that they were meant to preclude border adjust-
ments on processing.
The GATT has discussed factor taxes several times, but it has never
325. Report and Proceedings of the World Economic Conference 42, League of Nations Doc.
C.356 M.129 1927 11 (1927).
326. 1d.
327. Treaty of Commerce and Navigation Between the Kingdom of Italy and the
Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, July 14, 1924, art. 8, 82 L.N.T.S. 259
(emphasis added).
328. Commercial Agreement Between Germany and France, Aug. 17, 1927, art. 15,
76 L.N.T.S. 345, 349 (emphasis added).
329. Proclamation No. 100, art. IV, 50 Stat. 1504, 1510 (1935) (emphasis added).
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made a definitive ruling.3 30 In 1955, Germany attempted to gain an inter-
pretive note to Article 111:2 that would allow the loading of factor taxes on
imports but was unsuccessful.3 31 In 1970, the report of the GATT Work-
ing Party on Border Tax Adjustments was adopted. It stated that there was
a "divergence of views" as to the border adjustability of factor taxes.
33 2
Because of the "scarcity of complaints,"335 the working party did not draw
any conclusion. The issue of factor taxes on imports has not come up
since then.
In the Subsidies Code of the Tokyo Round, factor tax rebates were
included in the illustrative list of export subsidies which the signatories
agreed not to grant 3 34 Specifically, taxes on services used in the produc-
tion of goods are not border-adjustable, and taxes on goods used are bor-
der-adjustable only when the goods are physically incorporated into the
exported product3 3 5 These rules apply only to GATT parties who are
members of the Code; they are not GATT rules. The United States is a
member and applies this physical incorporation practice in its counter-
vailing duty law.
33 6
The Subsidies Code refers only to export rebates. Even countries that
have adopted the Code have no obligations for border adjustments on
imports. One might assume that the GATT's stance should be symmetric,
but, as Robert Pelikan has noted, the GATT does not require this.33 7 The
330. According to Robert Pelikan, some countries have used border adjustments for
such taxes. The U.S. response has been to countervail. Robert Pelikan, Border Taxes
and the GA7T, in I UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY IN AN INTERDEPEN-
DENT WoRLD 765, 770 (Papers Submitted to the Commission on International Trade
and Investment Policy and published in conjunction with the Commission's Report to
the President, 1971). Pelikan was a Treasury Department official during the Nixon
Administration.
331. See DAM, supra note 311, at 122; see also Tariffs, Schedules and Customs Administra-
ion, GATT, B.I.S.D., supra note 1, 3d Supp. 205, para. 10 (1955). It is interesting to
note that the United States opposed the German interpretation arguing that only inter-
nal taxes levied on the final product could be levied on imports. In the Superfund case
of 1987, the United States took the opposite position. See Superfund Report, supra note
64, para. 3.2.5.
332. Border Tax Adjustments, GAIT Doc. L/3464 (Dec. 2, 1970) B.I.S.D., supra note 1,
18th Supp. 97, para. 15 (1972) [hereinafter Border Tax Adjustments].
333. Id.
334. Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VT, XVI, and XXIII of the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT, B.I.S.D., supra note 1, 26th Supp. 56, art. 9.2
(1980). The Code defines "direct" taxes to include taxes on wages, profits and other
forms of income. Presumably taxes on wages means either income taxes on wages or
social security taxes paid by the employee. It can not mean payroll taxes paid by the
employer because those are not direct taxes. See RICHARD A. MUScRAVE & PEGGY B.
MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACr~cE 227-28 (1976).
335. Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XV, and XXIII of the Gen-
eral Agreement on Taiffs and Trade, supra note 334, Annex, para. h.
336. See HuAUER & ERn, supra note 302, at 56-57.
337. Pelikan, supra note 330, at 766 ("In view of the symmetry implied in the views of
some on border tax adjustments, an interesting piece of history is that the provisions on
the compensatory tax on imports and the rebate on exports developed quite sepa-
rately."); see also Gary C. Hufbauer, The Evolution of Border Tax Adjustments 21
(Report prepared for Center for Strategic Tax Reform, 1993) (A careful reading of
Cornell International Law Journal
GAYr Working Party of 1970 on Border Tax Adjustments stated that the
"GATT provisions on tax adjustment applied the principle of destination
identically to imports and exports," but this statement is too ambiguous to
deduce any GATT ruling.
33 8
The Uruguay Round Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures would apply the 1979 Code rule to all members of the WTO.3 39
This new rule permits export tax adjustments on physically incorporated
inputs (as did the 1979 Code), but it goes beyond that.3 40 In addition to
physically incorporated inputs, export rebates are permitted on "energy,
fuels and oil used in the production process .... " 341 Apparently, the
negotiators did not realize the implications of this action. 42 It is one
thing to allow rebates for taxes on oil used in a production method (for
example, to make plastics) or on electricity used in specialized processes
(like electrolysis). It is quite another to allow rebates for taxes on all elec-
tricity used in production or for a carbon tax on a manufacturer. The U.S.
government and several other countries have stated that the new rule will
not open the door to new border tax adjustments on energy.
3 43
Allowing rebates on exports of energy taxes would have little pro-envi-
ronmental effect. Indeed, one could argue that these rebates would be
anti-environmental (see section below) because they disinternalize envi-
ronmental costs. But allowing border adjustments on imports could have
an environmental impact. In the absence of a border adjustment for fac-
tor taxes, a country that imposes energy taxes will feel that similar, but
untaxed, imports have an unfair advantage. Less expensive imports have
no direct impact on the environment, of course. But if a country is politi-
cally unable to levy appropriate taxes on domestic production because of
the competitive effects of untaxed imports, that inability can have environ-
mental significance.
344
Disallowing factor tax adjustments on exports, as the Uruguay Round
does, might be viewed as being pro-environmental since exported prod-
ucts should bear their full costs. But if one assumes that the GATT
requires symmetry and thus the new rule disallows factor border adjust-
ments on imports, that rule could be viewed as being anti-environmental.
Of course, some commentators already think that the GATT disallows
these various GATT provisions reveals an asymmetry between permitted adjustments on
imports and exports.).
338. Border Tax Adjustments, supra note 332, para. 10.
339. SCM Agreement; supra note 49, art. III, § 1 (a).
340. Id. Annex I, para. h. This paragraph only applies to prior-stage cumulative indi-
rect taxes and thus may not apply to energy taxes which are indirect, non-cumulative,
specific taxes that fall under paragraph g.
341. Id. Annex II, n.59.
342. See GAT Environmental Subsidy Provision Angers U.S. Manufacturers, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Jan. 7, 1994, at 8.
343. See U.S. Secures Agreement Not to Use GATT To Allow Energy Tax Rebate, INsIDE U.S.
TRADE, Jan. 28, 1994, at 19.
344. SeeJ. Andrew Hoerner & Frank Muller, The Impact of a Broad-Based Energy Tax on
the Competitiveness of U.S. Industry, TAx No~rzs, June 21, 1993, at 1663, 1663-64.
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such border adjustments on imports.3 45 Had the new interpretation on
energy inputs been kept and applied also to imports, it might have been a
potentially useful rule from an environmental perspective.
Finally, the contribution of the GATT Dolphin I panel to this debate
should be noted. In considering whether the U.S. import prohibition on
tuna violated Article III, the panel declared that border adjustments were
permitted on taxes bome by products but not on taxes not borne by prod-
ucts, like social security charges. 346 The panel made no reference to the
fact that the GATT has no rule on factor taxes. This omission is significarIlt
because the panel determined that the U.S. measure violated Article III by
analogizing from the GATT's rules on border tax adjustments. The panel
likened a regulation against dolphin-unsafe tuna to a social security tax.
This is clearly an inapt analogy. If the panel had used an appropriate
analogy, such as likening the tuna import ban to a tax on the dolphins
consumed in tuna production, the panel would have had to conclude that
the GATT had no clear rule on that issue. The panel would also have had
to address the fact that there is some authority in the GATT drafting his-
tory for the interpretation of "indirectly" in Article III as applying not to a
product as such but to the making of the product.3 47 Thus, the Dolphin I
panel's decision on Article III relies on the same kinds of distortions as its




There is a tension in environmentalism regarding subsidies. On the one
hand, a core tenet of environmental 'economics is that a pricing system
reflective of social costs will produce more efficient and ecologically-sound
outcomes. Therefore, tax and regulatory policies that lead to internaliza-
tion of true environmental costs are desirable because they reflect prices
correctly. Conversely, subsidies, which pay certain costs, are undesirable
because they do not send the proper signal to producers (to use cleaner
methods) or to consumers (to conserve),
a50
On the other hand, subsidies are a direct way to finance environmen-
tal improvements. They are particularly well-suited to deal with past envi-
ronmental degradation. Subsidies may also have a useful role in instances
345. See, e.g., Esn', supra note 4, at 168.
346. Dolphin I Report, supra note 67, para. 5.13.
347. See GATT, ANALYIcA. INDEX: GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE 132 (6th ed.
1994); see also Demaret & Stewardson, supra note 303, at 18-19.
348. See Eric Christensen & Samantha Geffin, GA7T Sets its Net on Environmental Regu-
lation: The GAT Panel Ruling on Mexican Yelloufin Tuna Imports and the Need for Reform of
the International Trading System, 23 U. MuMI INTER-AM. L. Rav. 569, 583-85 (1991-92).
349. See Charles S. Pearson, Testing the System: GA7T + PPP - ?, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
553 (1994); Candice Stevens, Interpreting the Polluter Pays Principle in the Trade and
Environment Context 27 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 577 (1994).
350. See CAROL NELDER-CoRvARI, THE GREENING OF THE GATT: TRADE AND THE ENvi-
RONMENT 19-20 (Canada Department of Finance Working Paper, 1989).
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of market failure.35 ' For example, environmental subsidies may be justi-
fied in promoting new pollution control technologies because the private
sector is not making a sufficient investment for society's future needs.352
One "environmental" subsidy for which this tension does not exist is
the issue of governmental undepricing of natural resource inputs.3 53 This
is not a subsidy in the usual sense, that is, for improving the environment.
Instead, this kind of subsidy is designed to protect domestic markets and
promote exports. Its effects are likely to be anti-environmental by encour-
aging an excessive use of natural resources such as lumber, water, range
land, minerals, or energy. Government logging incentives in the United
States have been criticized for encouraging the overuse of land and thus
harming endangered species.
When the issue of pollution control subsidies first came to interna-
tional attention two decades ago, the Organization for Economic Co-oper-
ation and Development (OECD) recommended that nations follow a cost
allocation rule known as the "Polluter-Pays Principle" (PPP).354 Because it
was badly (or cleverly) named, the PPP is sometimes misunderstood. The
PPP says the following: "The polluter should bear the expenses of carry-
ing out.., measures decided by public authorities to ensure that the envi-
ronment is in an acceptable state."3 55 The PPP also states that public
measures should not include "subsidies that would create significant dis-
tortions in international trade and investment."
3 5 6
Despite its name, the PPP does not really call for polluters to pay any-
thing.357 It is a procedural injunction to governments.3 58 It prescribes no
specific attainment level for pollution control.3 59 It does not state how
351. See Richard Diamond, A Search for Economic and Financial Principles in the Adminis-
tration of United States Countervailing Duty Law, 21 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 507, 523
(1990).
352. Since the demand for pollution control technology is a function of public regu-
lation, a government may have better information about future demand than private
technologists do. In addition, companies may underinvest in new technology if they
believe that their inventions will be copied before they can gain an adequate financial
return.
353. Undercharging for a natural resource is not typically viewed as being environ-
mentally motivated.
354. See Guiding Principles ConcerningInternationalEconomic Aspects of Environmental Pol-
icies, OECD Doc. C(72)128 (May 26, 1972) [hereinafter OECD Guiding Principles], in
OECD AND THE ENVIRONMENT 23-25 (OECD ed., 1986).
355. Id., Annex, para. 4.
356. Id.
357. Judith Marquand, A Note on Some Problems of Transfrontier Pollution, in ECONOMICS
OF TRANSFRONnTER POLLUtrrION 11, 14 (OECD ed., 1976) ("[A] major advantage of the
[PPP] is that it allows individual countries to make their own valuations (including nil
valuations).").
358. Sanford E. Gaines, The Polluter-Pays Principle: From Economic Equity to Environmen-
tal Ethos, TEx. INT'L L.J., 463, 468 (1991).
359. OECD Environment Committee, Note on the Implementation of the Polluter-Pays
Principle in THE POLLUTER-PAYS PRINCIPLE 25, para. 2 (OECD ed., 1992) ("[The PPP]
does not involve bringing pollution down to an optimum level of any type.").
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much polluters should pay.3 60 Nor does the PPP recommend the princi-
ple of full internalization of environmental costs.3 61 If a public authority
mandates a certain standard for pollution control, the PPP says that given
the choice between the polluter paying to meet the standard and the gov-
ernment paying, the polluter should pay.3 62 Given the choice between
polluters paying and consumers paying, however, the PPP says nothing.
From the PPP perspective, "it does not matter whether the polluter
passes on to his prices some or all of the environment costs or absorbs
them."36 3 If the polluter has to pay, then it will look for less polluting
techniques. If consumers pay, then they will buy less of the product and
will switch to manufacturers who find less expensive ways to comply with
government pollution rules. There may be differing implications for
equity between polluter-pays and consumer-pays. But these are not
addressed by the PPP, which is aimed only at avoiding government subsidi-
zation of pollution control.364
The PPP offers no guidance for circumstances when environmental
damage spills outside the country responsible.3 65 One approach would be
the "mutual compensation" principle, under which the polluting country
makes its polluters pay for the damage outside its borders, while the
receiving country makes its consumers pay the foreign abatement costs.
366
360. Thus, the notion of establishing import standards to require other nations to
adhere to the PPP is vacuous because, under the PPP, the only requirement of an
exporting government is that it carry out any measures "decided by public authorities."
See OECD Guiding Principles, supra note 354, Annex, para. 4.
361. See OECD Environment Committee, Foreword, in THE POLLUTR-PAYS PIuNCIPLE,
supra note 359, at 5, para. 1.1 (In other words, the Polluter-Pays Principle is not in itself
a principle intended to internalize fully the costs of pollution.). But the PPP moves
toward internalization. See OECD Guiding Principles, supra note 354, Annex, para. 2
(Prices of goods should more closely reflect their relative scarcity.), para. 4 (The cost of
these measures should be reflected in the cost of goods and services.).
362. The general concept of making polluters pay has been adopted in other fora.
In the Single European Act of 1986 (amending the Treaty of Rome), the European
Community stated that action by the Community relating to the environment should be
based on certain principles including that "the polluter should pay." See Single Euro-
pean Act, art. 25, 1987 OJ. (L 169) 1, 11. In the Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development, Principle 16 calls for national authorities "to promote the internalisation
of environmental costs and the use of economic instruments, taking into account the
approach that the polluter should, in principle, bear the cost of pollution .... " Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development U.N. Conference on Environment and
Development, Principle 16, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/PC/WG.III/L33/Rev.1. (1992),
31 I.L.M. 876 (1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration].
363. OECD Environment Committee, supra note 361, para. 3.
364. The Principle was written under the assumption that the cost of pollution con-
trol would be large relative to the price of the good. Charles Pearson, Environmental
Control Costs and Border Adjustments, 27 NAT'L TAxJ. 599 (1974). Studies since the early
1970s have invalidated this assumption. Esrv, supra note 4, at 158-60. Thus, there may
be far less need for the PPP.
365. OECD Guiding Principles, supra note 354, Annex, para. 1 ("These principles do
not cover ... trans-frontier pollution ....").
366. SeeJon Nicolaisen et al., Economics and the Environment: A Survey of Issues and
Policy Options, in OECD ECONOMIC STUDIES 31, 37 (1991); see also OECD Secretariat,
Transfrontier Pollution Cost-Sharing, in ECONOMICS OF TRANSFRONTIER POLLUTION, supra
note 357, at 87, 88-89.
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This may also be called the "victim pays" approach. The receiving country
suffers any pollution not bad enough to engender a willingness to pay the
polluter to rectify.
The PPP was designed to ward off a specific problem of trade unfair-
ness, namely, finns in non-subsidizing countries competing against firms
in subsidizing countries. Another potential problem of trade unfairness is
different levels of environmental regulation between countries. The PPP
was not intended as a response to that problem.- According to the OECD
Guiding Principles, the solution to the unfairness arising from different
levels of environmental regulation, when valid reasons for such regulatory
differences do not exist, is "harmonization."
3 67
Some have suggested that the solution to the problem of any trade
"unfairness" stemming from different environmental standards is for all
countries to follow the ppp.3 68 But universal application of the PPP would
do little to address such "unfairness," because the level of pollution con-
trol would still be up to each government. A country can meet its PPP
responsibilities without providing a full internalization of environmental
costs.
The PPP has arisen only once in GATT dispute settlement. In the
Superfund dispute of 1987, the EC offered a novel argument about the
GATT consistency of certain border tax adjustments. The case involved a
U.S. law that imposed a tax on certain imported substances (e.g., sty-
rene).369 Under GATr Article III, a country can levy a tax "directly or
indirectly" on an imported product equal to a tax "directly or indirectly"
imposed on a like or substitutable domestic product.
3 7 0
However, the meaning of "indirectly" in this context was not com-
pletely clear. The United States imposed no domestic tax on such sub-
stances. Instead, its tax was on the chemical constituents (e.g., nickel) of
these substances (such as nickel oxide).371 The United States defended its
tax by pointing to GATr Article II, section 2(a) which allows import
charges (equivalent to an internal tax) "in respect of the like domestic
product or in respect of an article from which the imported product has been manu-
factured or produced in whole or in part.
3 72
The EC maintained that not all taxes were eligible for border adjust-
ment. "A tax levied on the sale of a product to finance a specific service,"
367. See OECD Guiding Principles, supra note 354, Annex, paras. 6-8; see also U.N. Con-
ference on the Human Environment, Recommendation 103(e), 11 I.L.M. 1416, 1462
(1972).
368. See, e.g., Feketekuty, supra note 90, at 189.
369. Superfund Revenue Act of 1986, § 515(a) (current version codified at 26 U.S.C.
§§ 4671-72 (1988)). The substances are those in which certain taxed chemicals consti-
tute over one-half of either the weight or the volume. Exports of such chemicals are
exempt from taxation. See 26 U.S.C. § 4662(e) (1988).
370. GATiT, supra note 1, art. III, § 2, Ad art. III, § 2.
371. See 26 U.S.C. § 4661 (1988). In effect, the United States looked inside the
imported products and then collected the amount of tax that would have been imposed
on the feedstock chemicals used in producing the import if these chemicals had been
bought in the United States.
372. See Superfund Repor4 supra note 64, para. 3.2.5.
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according to the EC, was not eligible for border tax adjustment.8 73 The
EC stated that the U.S. tax was used to finance measures to clean up the
hazardous waste created by the use of such substances in the process of
production in the United States.3 74 Furthermore, it was "equally inappro-
priate to exempt export sales from the tax ... .a75 In addition, the EC
complained that such a tax adjustment departed from the Polluter-Pays
Principle.
3 76
The GAIT panel determined that the U.S. tax, in principle, was eligi-
ble for a border adjustment regardless of the policy purpose of the tax.3
77
After examining the specifics of the U.S. tax, the panel concluded that it
met the requirement of GATT Article II, section 2(a), i.e., that the import
charge be equivalent to the internal tax.3 78 The panel did not directly
address the question of whether the U.S. tax was consistent with the
ppp,3 79 but instead dismissed the EC's argument, deciding that the PPP
was not a GATT obligation.
38 0
Several points about the Superfund case should be noted. The GATT
decision makes clear that tax adjustments at the border can be used to
match not only taxes expressly levied on a domestic product but also
upstream taxes levied on ingredients embodied in the product. For exam-
ple, the United States imposes a domestic tax on ozone-depleting chemi-
cals coupled with a tax on imported products composed of such
chemicals.3 8 1 This import tax is equivalent to the tax "borne" by domestic
chemicals and, therefore, it would seem in accord with national
treatment.
3 82
373. Id. para. 3.2.7.
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Id. Actually, the PPP relates only to cost allocation. The OECD principle noted
by the EC is technically not part of the PPP. More important is the fact that the EC took
this principle out of context. The OECD recommendation relates to regulatory equili-
bration, not.tax equalization. See OECD Guiding Principles, supra note 354, Annex, para.
13 (Differences in environmental policies should not lead to the introduction of com-
pensating import levies or export rebates designed to offset the consequences of these
differences in prices.).
377. Supefund Repor4 supra note 64, para. 5.2.4.
378. Id. paras. 5.2.7-5.2.10. According to the panel, "The tax is imposed on the
imported substances because they are produced from chemicals subject to an excise tax
in the United States and the tax rate is determined in principle in relation to the
amount of these chemicals used and not in relation to the value of the imported sub-
stance." Id. para. 5.2.8.
379. See id. para. 5.2.6. Perhaps the United States could have argued that the
Superfund law conformed to the PPP by making foreign producers of polluting sub-
stances pay. In line with the PPP, the public authority (the United States) determines
what measures are needed to assure that the global environment is in an acceptable
state.
380. Id.
381. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, § 7506(a) (current version codi-
fied at 26 U.S.C. §§ 4681-82 (1988). For a discussion of the impact of this tax on the
use of CFCs in Southeast Asia, see GATTery v Greenery, supra note 3, Survey 14.
382. Exported chemicals are exempt from the U.S. tax in certain instances. Such an
exemption is in accord with Article III.
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The Superfund case also raises the problem of double taxation. The
European Commission argued that even if the U.S. excise tax on imported
substances was equivalent to the domestic tax, it would be unfair to make
European industries "bear the costs of environmental protection twice:
once in the exporting country in accordance with the Polluter-Pays Princi-
ple, again upon importation into the United States under the Superfund
Act."383 The Commission did not claim that it actually imposed such pol-
lution taxes on its producers. Rather, the Commission stated that under
the PPP, it "could be assumed" by the GATT that the EC had paid for the
pollution at home.38 4 The Commission did not explain why the GATT
should assume the best about EC environmental policies.
Unlike some of the bilateral trade agreements that preceded it,38 5 the
GATT has no provisions dealing specifically with double taxation. Yet
under GATT rules, double taxation can easily be avoided.3 8 6 If the EU
actually imposes a domestic excise tax on such substances, it may rebate
such taxes upon exportation.
The U.S. Superfund law takes no account of whether foreign coun-
tries impose excise taxes that are similar to the American tax. If, on
grounds of fairness, the United States sought to give "credit" to foreign
countries that imposed a similar domestic excise tax on harmful chemi-
cals, that would raise Most Favored Nation (MFN) trading status problems
(and would be "extrajurisdictional"3 8 7 ). Thus, the GAT system may have
no way to assure that at least one country (the exporter or the importer)
loads the environmental tax onto the product.
Another aspect of the Superfund decision is that it makes no differ-
ence under GATT what a government does with its environmental tax rev-
enues.38 8 Spending it for a domestic environmental purpose does not,
ipsofacto, render the tax illegal (or legal). Of course, governments would
not be free to spend the funds in ways that violate the GATT, for instance,
by rebating exporters for their costs of meeting environmental
regulations.
383. Superfund Repor4 supra note 64, para. 3.2.8 (emphasis added).
384. Id.
385. See, e.g., RICHARD C. SNYDER, THE MOST-FAVORED-NATION CLAUSE 181 (1948).
386. The panel also noted that the United States has the right not to tax products
from foreign countries. In other words, the GATT permits governments to provide
differentially better treatment to imports. See Superfund Report, supra note 64, para.
5.2.5.
387. Extrajurisdictional trade measures aim to promote environmental goals outside
of the country taking the measure. The Dolphin I panel held that Article XX did not
permit extrajurisdictionality. Dolphin I Report, supra note 67. SeeJan McDonald, Legal
Framework and Critical Issues, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE, INvESTMENT AND ENVIRONMENT.
PROCEEDINGS OF T14E 1993 FENNER CONFERENCE ON THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 5, at
69-70.
388. Superfund Repor4 supra note 64, para. 5.2.4. The EC had argued that taxes for
specific purposes, like the environment, were not eligible for border adjustments. See
id. para. 3.2.7. The United States argued that the primary motivation behind the
Superfund tax was to raise revenue, not to get consumers or producers to internalize
their environmental costs. Id. para. 3.2.9.
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The Uruguay Round retreats from the concept of PPP by removing
the right to impose countervailing duties against certain pollution control
and research subsidies unless there are "serious adverse effects" and then
only with WTO approval.38 9 These "green box" provisions may not violate
the letter of the PPP recommendation, however, because they generally fit
the exceptions authored by the OECD.
39 0
In recent years, the term "polluter pays" has taken on a somewhat
different meaning than its original usage.391 The PPP is now often used to
imply that a producer should fully internalize its environmental.costs.
3 9 2
Thus, the idea that the polluter should pay the costs of government-man-
dated pollution control has evolved into the idea that the polluter should
pay the social costs of the pollution.
Some have suggested that this broader view of PPP be incorporated as
a GATT principle both on environmental grounds and to provide trade
fairness. 393 However, it is unclear what such full-cost internalization
would mean. In the Superfund case, the EC raised the point of whether
exported products should be exempt from environmental taxes.3 9 4 Since
there is no environmental reason to allow such an exemption,3 9 5 the
GATT's border adjustment rules might be changed to disallow it 3 96 Alter-
natively, the GATT might permit the exemption only if the importing
country imposes a commensurate internal tax.
A more radical reform would allow countries that fully internalize
their environmental costs to countervail imports of countries that do
not.39 7 In other words, if the exporting country does not ensure that all
environmental costs are loaded into the product's costs, the importing
country will do it for them via a tariff.398 The rationale could be fairer
389. SCM Agreement; supra note 49, arts. VIII-IX.
390. See Pearson, supra note 349.
391. The EU Maastricht Treaty states that Community policy on the environment
shall be based on certain principles including the principle that "environmental dam-
age should as a priority be rectified at source and that the polluter should pay." See
Maastricht Treaty on Political Union, Feb. 7, 1992, art. 130r(2), 31 I.L.M. 247, 255
(entered into force Nov. 1, 1993). This may have a different meaning than the OECD
principle.
392. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL INsTrrTuTE FOR SUsrAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, TRADE AND
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT PRINCIPLES 19-20 (1994); Rio Declaration, supra note 362,
Principle 16 ("[T] he polluter should, in principle, bear the cost of the pollution .... ").
393. See, e.g., NELDER-CoRvAR, supra note 350, at 14-15. As far as this author can
determine, Nelder-Corvari is the first commentator to use the greening of the GATT
metaphor. See also Ursula Kettlewell, GATT-Will Liberalized Trade Aid Global Environ-
mental Protection?, DENT. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 55, 72 (1992).
394. Superfund Repor supra note 64, para. 3.2.8.
395. The OECD Principles concerning transfrontier pollution state that the PPP
should be applied to all polluters within a country without regard to whether the pollu-
tion is internal or transfrontier. See OECD AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 354, at
144-45 (C.4.d).
396. See GATT, supra note 1, Ad art. XVI headnote. The Williams Commission rec-
ommended that such taxes be rebated. See COMMISsION ON INT'L TRADE AND INV. POL-
ICY, supra note 32, at 130-39.
397. See Esm', supra note 4, at 177-78.
398. See Wirth, supra note 61, at 1399-1400.
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competition, environmentally-sound pricing, or both. The main problem
with this option is that there is no way to operationalize it.3 99 Even for
identical production processes, each countries' "costs" will be different
owing to variations in national characteristics and preferences. 40 0 There is
no consistent way that an importing country can make this determination
for the exporting country.
40 1
Permitting countries to impose taxes on imports according to the pol-
lution emitted in producing that import would raise very difficult GATT
conundrums. On the one hand, distinguishing between countries would
seem to violate MFN. On the other hand, tailoring an adjustment to each
product would raise a subtle problem of national treatment. The princi-
ple of giving foreign products credit for actions taken at home is well-
established in the regulatory rules of GATT Article III. For instance, while
the United States requires that domestic cheeses be pasteurized, it does
not require that already pasteurized imported cheeses be re-pasteurized at
the border. Rather, it recognizes (or gives credit to) foreign pasteuriza-
tion. Requiring re-pasteurization would seem like a violation of national
treatment. But if, under Article III, a foreign process (test or inspection)
does not have to be repeated at the border, why should a foreign environ-
mental tax have to be repeated on an import at the border?40 2 Thus, if
the U.S. tax is levied as an environmental internalization requirement, why
should it be treated differently than any other "quality" requirement?40 3
In trying to rewrite GAIT disciplines for border adjustments, one
might return to the point raised by the EC that hazardous waste sites are a
U.S. domestic problem. 40 4 The strongest policy case for border tax adjust-
ments regarding the production process of imported products would be
when the externalities of production cross borders. Thus, one could envi-
sion a regime that would allow import border adjustments for taxes on
chloroflourocarbons (CFCs) used in the production process40 5 but disal-
low import border adjustments for taxes on solar energy used in the pro-
duction process. In other words, the importing country could apply its
CFC tax to imported goods because CFCs cause transborder harm, but it
could not apply its solar energy tax to imported goods because solar
panels do not cause transborder harm.
399. The traditional argument made against such eco-duties is that they would be
unnecessary if governments followed the Polluter-Pays Principle and pursued harmoni-
zation. See OECD Guiding Principles, supra note 354, Annex, para. 13. But this argument
does not deal with competitiveness concerns arising from different environmental laws.
400. Stewart, supra note 40, at 2103 (stating that there is no objective or uniform
"cost" of pollution).
401. For a detailed discussion, see Gerald Brooks, Environmental Economics and Inter-
national Trade: An Adaptive Approach, 5 GEo. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 277, 295-303 (1993).
402. The situation would be clearer if many countries agreed to impose a harmo-
nized environmental tax.
403. If the U.S. tax is levied simply as a revenue raiser, then there would be no rea-
son to give credit for foreign taxes paid.
404. Superfund Repor supra note 64, para. 3.2.7.
405. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 4681(b)(2) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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In conclusion, the PPP was designed to harmonize government poli-
cies (i.e., the policy of inaction) regarding subsidies for pollution control.
It is unclear whether the PPP should be credited for heading off such
subsidies, or whether budget deficits, the threat of countervailing duties,
and the unpopularity of polluters were more important factors. Regard-
less of the reason, the absence of conflict in this area is noteworthy.
Ill. National Policies
Part III critiques the policies on the environment/trade linkage by the
European Commission, the Reagan and Bush Administrations, and the
Clinton Administration. It does not attempt a comprehensive assessment
of these policies, but rather it examines those elements that have been
least conducive to achieving progress in the overall debate.
A. European Commission
The Commission's policy is characterized by hypocrisy. On the one hand,
the EU is a user of unilateral, extrajurisdictional environmental trade
measures. Some are product-oriented, such as the ban on baby seals and
whale products discussed above. Some are process-oriented, such as the
ban on fur caught in countries that allow leg-hold traps and the ban on
cosmetics containing ingredients tested on animals.40 6 On the other
hand, the Commission regularly deplores the use of unilateral and
extrajurisdictional measures.
40 7
The Commission has strongly endorsed and called for the adoption
of the GATr Dolphin I report.40 8 According to the Commission, "the
report sent an overall positive message about the possibility of reconciling
trade and environment policies"40 9 and "was also a necessary first step in
clarifying the relationship between environmental policies and GAT pro-
visions."4 10 The Commission seemed unworried about any dangers to the
world environment or to the GATT as an institution from the immediate
adoption of the report. The Commission seemed unconcerned that the
European Parliament had called for the Commission to ban the importa-
tion of tuna caught by purse seine nets.4 1 ' According to a committee of
the European Parliament, "regular attempts have been made to persuade
the Commission that it is taking a short-sighted and legalistic stance at
406. Council Regulation 3254/91, 1991 O.J. (L 308) 1; Council Directive 93/35,
1993 OJ. (L 151) 32. Both of these process bans were adopted after the GATT Dolphin
I report was released, but they are not yet in force.
407. See, e.g., SFRvcs OFrm EUROPEAN COMMISSION, REORT ON UNrrED STATES BAR-
RIERS TO TRADE AND INvEsnMENT 19-21 (1993).
408. Minutes of Meeting of the GATT Council on 18 February 1992, 22-23, GAIT Doc. C/
M/254 (Mar. 10, 1992).
409. Id. at 22.
410. Id. at 23. The official minutes of GATT Council meetings are not verbatim
transcripts.
411. SeeEC Parliamentaian's Letter on Tuna Case, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Mar. 20, 1992, at
S-22.
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variance with its rhetoric on the environment."
412
The Commission also argues that the GATT contains a least trade
restrictive requirement for environmental measures. 4 13 The Commission
may be confusing its own case law, which does contain such a require-
ment,4 14 with the GATT" case law, which does noL4 1 5 Perhaps the Com-
mission is attempting to apply its own law extraterritorially through the
GATT.
Although the Commission has not argued that the Basel Convention
and the Montreal Protocol should be ruled GATT-illegal, it.has argued for
GATT disciplines on environmental treaties using trade measures. For
example, the Commission opposes the use of trade sanctions (i.e., against
unrelated products) in such treaties.4 16 Moreover, a Commission official
has declared that the trade provisions in the Montreal Protocol are
"regrettable." 417
The Commission has also complained about California's recycling
content requirements for glass containers. This law applies equally to
domestic- and foreign-made containers. According to the Commission,
"the application of such a domestic environmental requirement to
imported products is not in conformity with GATT rules."
418
Finally, although the North-South tension in the trade and environ-
ment debate is a sensitive issue, the Commission seems intent on aggravat-
ing it. For example, in December 1992, the World Wide Fund for Nature
wrote to the EC's ambassador to the GATT to express concerns about cre-
ating a powerful Multilateral Trade Organization (MTO) 41 9 that might
prevent developing countries from following sustainable development. In
response, the EC's ambassador explained the benefits of the MTO but also
declared that "[t]hat the MTO is unpopular in some industrialized coun-
tries, notably in the United States of America, is one more indication that
it will benefit developing countries." 420 The Commission is also hostile to
efforts by the United States to improve the transparency of the GATT as an
institution. When the Clinton Administration recently proposed that rep-
resentatives from non-governmental organizations be permitted to
412. Report of the Committee on External Economic Relations on Environment and
Trade, EUR. PARL.. Doc. (PE 201.431/fin.) 10 (1992).
413. See, e.g., EC Proposal on Trade and Environment, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Nov. 27, 1992,
at S-2, S-3, S-5.
414. See Geradin, supra note 166.
415. For a review of the concepts of "least trade restrictive" and "proportionality" in
GATI instruments and jurisprudence, see Agenda Item 1: Trade Provisions Contained in
Existing Multilateral Environmental Agreements Vis-A-Vis GA7T7 Principles and Provisions,
GATT Doc. TRE/W/16/Rev. 1 (Oct. 14, 1993).
416. ECProposal on Trade and Environment, INsIDE U.S. TRADE, Nov. 27, 1992, at S-2, S-
5.
417. Uruguay Round Negotiations Face Range of Difficulties, EC Official Says, Ir'L TRAE
REp., Apr. 1993, at 661-62.
418. SERVICES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 407, at 62-63.
419. At the end of the Uruguay Round, the MTO was renamed the WTO.
420. Letter from Tran Van-Thinh, Ambassador to the GAIT for the European
Union, to Charles Arden-Clarke, World-Wide Fund for Nature (Apr. 3, 1993) (on file
with the Cornell International Law Journal).
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observe the GATT's Committee on trade and environment, the delegate
from the European Union sarcastically asked whether "farm animals"
should be brought into meetings on agricultural issues.
421
B. The Reagan and Bush Administrations
For many years, U.S. policy was tolerant of foreign decision-making about
health. Consider, for example, the law of 1916, stating that
[w] henever any country, dependency, or colony shall prohibit the importa-
tion of any article the product of the soil or industry of the United States
and not injurious to health or morals, the President shall have power to
prohibit... the importation into the United States of similar articles ... 422
The Congress authorizes retaliation but not when the foreign trade bar-
rier is related to health. Such deference to foreign choices about health
was not included in Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974,423 which gave
the President broad authority to retaliate against foreign trade practices.
Much of U.S. policy on trade and environment (indeed much of the
shape of the entire trade and environment debate) was formed in the mid-
1980s during the meat hormone dispute. To simplify the facts of this very
complex dispute, the European Commission banned the use of growth
hormones in European meat and applied a similar rule to imports.
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The Reagan Administration took great offense at this and imposed trade
sanctions under Section 301,425 despite the fact that such sanctions were
GATT-illegal. 42 6 When Texas Agriculture Commissioner Jim Hightower
offered to defuse the situation by working out a plan to provide hormone-
free meat,42 7 U.S. Secretary of Agriculture Clayton Yeutter went so far as
to threaten him with prosecution under the Logan Act 428 because Hight-
ower was cooperating with EC officials.4 29 Had Yeutter been primarily
concerned about the loss of U.S. exports, he would have applauded Hight-
ower's action. The fact that Yeutter responded in such a pugnacious man-
ner showed that the concern was instead that if the U.S. government
cooperated in supplying hormone-free meat to the Community, American
consumers might also ask for hormone-free meat.
421. See U.S. To Call for NGO Observers in WTO Environment Committee, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Sept. 16, 1994, at 13.
422. 15 U.S.C. § 75 (1988).
423. 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1988).
424. For a discussion, see Adridn Rafael Halpern, The U.S.-EC Hormone Beef Controversy
and the Standards Code: Implications for the Application of Health Regulations to Agricultural
Trade, 14 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 135 (1989).
425. See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative: Unfair Trade Practices; European
Community Hormones Directive, 52 Fed. Reg. 45304 (1987).
426. The trade sanctions violated GATT Articles I and II.
427. See EC's Andriessen to Meet with USTR Hills Over Hormone Dispute, EC Spokeswoman
Says, Irr'L TRADE REP., Feb. 8, 1989, at 171, 172.
428. 18 U.S.C. § 953 (1988).
429. See Nelson Graves, Texan Draws Ire of Washington in EC Hormone Ban Sideshow,
RETER Bus. REP., Feb. 8, 1989.
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There is no compelling evidence that feeding hormones to livestock is
unsafe to consumers. Nevertheless, the Community banned them because
of public concern. 430 The U.S. government might have shown tolerance
to such a foreign government decision but did not.
431
During the same period, American negotiators sought a strong agree-
ment in the Uruguay Round to harmonize and supervise sanitary and
phytosanitary standards.432 Moreover, the Bush Administration went so
far as to seek an amendment to GATT Article XX(b) to require consis-
tency with "sound scientific evidence and recognition of equivalency."
43 3
Indeed, it was the SPS issue that sparked the trade and environment
debate in the early 1990s as food s~fety groups and environmentalists
began to discover the latent and potential role of the GATT in health and
environmental supervision.
The first invocation of Article XX(g) as a defense in a GATT dispute
came in 1981 in the U.S. Tuna case.43 4 The dispute had nothing to do
with the environment.43 5 Canada seized U.S. fishing vessels in a fisheries
dispute, and the U.S. retaliated by banning tuna imports from Canada.
435
Nevertheless, the U.S. Trade Representative unwisely sought to defend the
action by claiming that it was related to conservation. 43 7 The GATT panel
ruled against the United States. 43 8 In doing so, it suggested that the
import ban was not inconsistent with the disciplines of the Article XX
headnote.43 9 Because this was the first Article XX environmental case, it
established an unfortunate precedent of diluting the headnote. As a
result, subsequent adjudication has gone askew in insinuating disciplines
into subsections (b) and (g) rather than invoking the ones already in the
headnote.
4 40
It is not clear whether the Bush Administration ever had a policy on
430. See European Officials Emphasize Hormone Ban Is A Consumer Issue, Not a Trade Bar-
rier, INT'L TRADE REP., Feb. 15, 1989, at 196.
431. The Congress recommended that the Reagan Administration take action. See
generally 21 U.S.C. § 620(h) (1988).
432. Maury E. Bredahl & Kenneth W. Forsythe, Harmonizing Phyto-sanitary and Sani-
tary Regulations, 12 WORLD ECON. 189 (1989).
433. Synoptic Table of Negotiating Proposals Submitted Pursuant to Paragrapah I1 of the
Mid-Term Review Agreement on Agriculture, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NGS/W/150/Rev.1
(1990).
434. Tuna Case, supra note 63.
435. See Thomas E. Skilton, Note, GAT!" and the Environment in Conflict: The Tuna-
Dolphin Dispute and the Quest for an International Conservation Strategy, 26 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 455, 475-76 (1993) (The United States imposed an import ban on Canadian tuna
and tuna products because of a Canadian seizure of U.S. fishing vessels during a fishing
rights dispute.).
436. Tuna Case, supra note 63, para. 2.1.
437. Id para. 3.5. It is unclear to what extent the Carter Administration also played a
role in devising the U.S. legal strategy.
438. Id. para. 4.12.
439. Id. par. 4.8.
440. See Steve Charnovitz, Exploring the Environmental Exceptions in GATT Article XX, J.
WORLD TRADE, Oct. 1991, at 37, 47-55.
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trade and the environment.44 1 It never publicly articulated one, and most
of its efforts seemed passive. However, inaction can also count as a policy,
and much of what the Administration did falls into that category. Despite
a specific statutory mandate in the Clean Air Act,442 the Bush Administra-
tion failed to submit the study on the impact of differing air quality stan-
dards on U.S. competitiveness.
Although the initial position of the Bush Administration had been
that the NAFTA was a trade agreement and thus had little to do with the
environment, 443 by the end of the negotiation, in the summer of 1992, the
Administration decided to play up the environmental aspects of the
NAFTA and pronounce the trade agreement as the "greenest" ever.444
It is sometimes suggested that the absence of support in the GATT for
the U.S. Marine Mammal Protection Act 4 5 (MMPA) shows that the U.S
position is wrong. But the absence of support may also indicate that the
Bush Administration did not seek any support. Recall that the import ban
against Mexico was implemented by the Bush Administration only upon
court order.4 46 When the panel report was discussed in the GAIT Coun-
cil, the U.S. ambassador to the GAIT (Rufus Yerxa) made no attempt to
explain why the import ban was needed and why GAT Article XX permit-
ted such actions. Instead, he said that "certain U.S. Congressmen"
thought that the panel's report conflicted with environmental policy.
44 7
He also reminded the Council that the Bush Administration was acting
pursuant to court order.448 He seemed to be signaling to other countries
not to take the official U.S. position seriously.
441. This is not to suggest that the Bush Administration did not work hard at it.
Indeed, they may have worked too hard. In March 1992, the Assistant U.S. Trade
Representative for Intellectual Property and the Environment (Carmen Suro-Bredie)
explained at a Congressional hearing that
[w]e now have constituted a Trade and Environment Subcommittee that con-
sists both of trade officials and wide participation by EPA, the Council on Envi-
ronmental Quality, and other agencies, Interior, that have responsibility for the
environmental side of our legislation. And this group has been meeting, basi-
cally, non-stop. We are talking about people closed in a room hour after hour
working on position papers that we have presented to the OECD and on posi-
tions that we are presenting to the GATT.
Review of the Administration's Proposal to Promote Dolphin Protection, Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment of the Comm. on Merchant
Marine and Fsheries, 102nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 17 (1992) (statement of Carmen Suro-
Bredie, Asst. U.S. Trade Representative for Intellectual Property and the Environment).
442. See 42 U.S.C. § 7612 and notes (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
443. See, e.g., Evelyn Iritani, Social Issues Pact Doesn't Belong in Trade Agreement Hills
Argues, SErArta POST-INTELLGENCER, Aug. 21, 1991.
444. See Steve Charnovitz, NAFTAs Social Dimension: Lessons from the Past and Frame-
work for the Futur Irr'L TRADE J., Spring 1994, at 39, 50-53.
445. 16 U.S.C. § 1361 (1988).
446. Recently, the U.S. Court of Appeals determined that these orders were
improper because the lawsuits should have been filed in the U.S. Court of International
Trade. See Earth Island Asks CA 9 Panel to Rehear Tuna-Dolphin Case, INT'L TRADE REP.,
Mar. 23, 1994, at 473.
447. GATT Doc. C/M/254, supra note 408, at 34.
448. Id.
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When the U.N Conference on Trade and Development approved the
Cartagena Resolution in February 1992, 449 the Bush Administration
apparently did not protest. This resolution stated that "[u]nilateral
actions to deal with environmental challenges outside the jurisdiction of
the importing country should be avoided."45 0 This same provision was
included in the Rio Declaration later that year.45 ' The fact that this state-
ment has been blessed by the UNCED has handicapped efforts to make
progress in the GATr. 452 The Bush Administration also agreed to the
provision in Agenda 21 that certain principles should apply to the use of
trade measures for the enforcement of environmental policies, including
"the principle that the trade measure chosen should be the least trade-
restrictive necessary to achieve the objectives." 453
To the surprise of many observers, the Bush Administration approved
the GATI's adoption of the U.S. Alcoholic Beverages panel report in 1992
even though it had significant potential ramifications for government reg-
ulations.45 4 First, the decision states that the GATT "is superior to GATr-
inconsistent state law" in the United States. 455 Second, the panel suggests
that executive action, such as the acceptance of the GAT by the Presi-
dent, could change or overrule state laws.4 56 Third, the panel found that
the state tax credits based on the size of a brewery violate the GATT
national treatment requirement even if the credit were available identi-
cally to foreign and domestic breweries.45 7 On the other hand, the deci-
sion is useful in clarifying that the "like product" concept in the GATT was
not meant to preclude legitimate product differentiation. 458
C. The Clinton Administration
It is unclear to what extent the Clinton Administration is filling the leader-
ship void on this issue. One troublesome development is the recent artic-
ulation of principles by State Department Counselor Tim Wirth
concerning extrajurisdictional environmental trade measures. 45 9 Wirth
identifies four criteria that justify the consideration of trade measures in
support of environmental objectives:
449. The Cartagena Commitment, supra note 9.
450. Id. para. 152.
451. Rio Declaration, supra note 362, Principle 12.
452. See, e.g., GATT Environment Work Delayed By Dispute Over Unilateral Action, INsIDE
U.S. TRADE, Nov. 13, 1992, at S-1.
453. Agenda 21, supra note 13, ch. 2, sec. 2.22(i), ch. 39, sec. 39.3(d).
454. Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, GATT, B.I.S.D., supra note 1, 39th
Supp. 206 (1993).
455. Id. para 5.80.
456. Id. para. 5.48.
457. Id. para. 5.19.
458. Id. para. 5.25.
459. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Commerce and Tourism of the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1994) (testimony of
Timothy E. Wirth, Counselor, Dept. of State), available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Cngtst
File.
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1. when trade measures are an obligation under an international envi-
ronmental agreement to which we are a party, assuming non-discriminatory
treatment of non-parties;
2. when the environmental effect of an activity is partially within our
jurisdiction;
3. when a plant or animal species is endangered or threatened, or
where a particular practice will likely cause a species to become endangered
or threatened;
4. where the effectiveness of a scientifically-based international envi-
ronmental or conservation standard is being diminished, provided the stan-
dard is specific enough that the judgment as to whether it has been
"diminished" can be made objectively.
The consideration, as well as the use, of trade measures in these cir-
cumstances seems warranted. Yet what is most interesting is what these
carefully drawn criteria seem to exclude.460 For example, trade restric-
tions under the Montreal Protocol and the Basel Convention are excluded
from the first criterion because they rely on discriminatory treatment of
non-parties.4 61 The application of recycling content standards to imports
is excluded from the second criterion. 462 The tuna import bans under the
MMPA are probably excluded from the third criterion because dolphins
are not endangered or threatened. 463 The import bans under the Wild
Bird Conservation Act of 1992464 that apply to species not covered by
CITES may also be excluded from the third criterion. The use of the "sci-
entifically-based" criterion in the fourth criterion is designed to reduce
pressure on the Administration for using the Pelly Amendment, which
does not require that environmental treaties be science-based. 465 For
example, the continuing ban on commercial whaling by the International
Whaling Commission has been criticized as being grounded in a moral
rather than a scientific judgment.46 6 Moreover, it is unclear whether the
fourth criterion would have permitted the U.S. ban on the importation of
driftnet-caught fish from the South Pacific Ocean after July 1, 1991.
467
There was a related U.N. Resolution, but it does not countenance import
actions.
4 68
460. For simplicity, the following cases do not go through each of the four criteria
but look only at the particular criteria that might support use of the measure.
461. See Montreal Protocol, supra note 78.
462. Recycling content standards relate to the externalities of production. There is
no environmental difference to the consuming nation whether the bottle is recycled or
brand new glass. Therefore, the environmental effect of the glassmaking activity is not
even partially within the U.S. jurisdiction.
463. Esrv, supra note 4, at 188.
464. 16 U.S.C. § 4907 (1988).
465. See Charnovitz, supra note 273.
466. See generally Cathy Roheim Wessells & Peter Wallstr6m, New Dimensions in World
Fisheries: Implications for U.S. and E.C. Trade in Seafood, in AGRicuLTuRAL TRADE CON-
FLICrS AND GATT: NEw DIMENSIONS IN NORTH AMERIcAN-EUROPEAN AGRICULTURAL
TRADE RELATIONS 515, 532 (Giovanni Anania et al. eds., 1994).
467. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a) (2) (E) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
468. Resolution 225, supra note 270.
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The interpretations offered here are subject to debate. However, the
Administration has done little to clarify these criteria. If the Administra-
tion is going to propose such a new policy, it would be helpful to the
public if it would simultaneously give its interpretation of how these crite-
ria relate to existing U.S. laws utilizing environmental trade measures.
The other troublesome point about these principles is that they fail to
make use of many important analytical distinctions in the trade and envi-
ronment debate. For example, there is no distinction between standards
and sanctions, even though countries presumably should have GATT
greater rights to do the former. There is also no distinction as to the
degree of intrusiveness of the environmental measure. Finally, there is no
distinction between environmental activities in the global commons and
such activities in a foreign country.
Clinton Administration officials regularly declare their interest in rec-
onciling trade and the environment. For instance, in announcing new
office space for the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in Washing-
ton's new international trade center, Vice President Gore explained that
"it is important that EPA be consolidated into a prominent location that
demonstrates the importance that this nation places on linking sound
trade policy with sound environmental policy."469 But the Administration
resisted calls to link the lifting of the trade embargo against Vietnam to
environmental improvements. 470 In the three Pelly certifications 47' that
came to President Clinton, he announced sanctions in only one of
them.4 72 The U.S. Department of Commerce also seems to be avoiding
implementation of trade sanctions against nations permitting driftnet fish-
ing as required by U.S. law.
4 73
One of the most significant actions in 1993 was that the Clinton
Administration consented to new Uruguay Round agreements on SPS and
TBT which will significantly tighten the current GAIT. 4 7 4 Of course,
these agreements were inherited from the Bush Administration. 47 More-
over, the Clinton Administration succeeded in making a few last-minute
changes to slightly water down the new disciplines.476 Nevertheless, the
469. Linda Langhorst Raclin, Clean Trade, Gov'T ExEc., Jan. 1994, at 36.
470. See Green Groups Call for Administration to Maintain Vietnam Embargo, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Sept. 10, 1993, at 14.
471. 22 U.S.C. § 1978. For a discussion, see Steve Chamovitz, Encouraging Environ-
mental Cooperation Through the Pelly Amendment, J. ENV'T & DEv., Winter 1994, at 3.
472. Thomas L. Friedman, U.S. Puts Sanctions on Taiwan, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 12, 1994, at
DI; Charnovitz, supra note 273, at 769-72.
473. See House Members Call for Sanctions Against France in Fish Dispute, INsIDE U.S.
TRADE, Feb. 18, 1994, at 17-18; see 16 U.S.C. § 1826a.
474. See Steve Charnovitz, The World Trade Organization and Environmental Supervision,
INT'L ENV'T REP., Jan. 26, 1994, at 89; see also Frances Williams, Trade Accord Boost for
Global Standardisation, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1994, at 3.
475. See Steve Charnovitz, Trade Negotiations and the Environment, IN-r'L ENV'T REP.,
Mar. 11, 1992, at 144. This discusses the provisions in the Dunkel Text, which some
environmentalists called the Draft Dunkel Text (DDT).
476. The Uruguay Round. Growthfor the World,Jobs for the U.S.: Hearings Before the House
Ways and Means Comm., 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (testimony of Michael Kantor, U.S.
Trade Representative), available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Cngtst File.
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agreements remain much tighter than the current GATT. (Ironically, the
room where heads of GATT delegations meet to settle key issues is called
the "Green Room.") The most troublesome feature of the Clinton Admin-
istration's policy is its denial that the SPS and TBT agreements potentially
threaten U.S. environmental standards. For example, U.S. Trade Repre-
sentative Mickey Kantor testified to Congress that the Uruguay Round will
not "limit the ability of the United States to set its own environmental or
health standards."47 7 He based this conclusion on his view that the TBT
agreement "provides that each country may determine its appropriate
level of protection and ensures that the encouragement to use interna-
tional standards will not result in downward harmonization." 478 Unfortu-
nately, it is difficult to find support for this view in the actual text of the
Uruguay Round.
The Uruguay Round may also facilitate international pressure against
the United States for using trade measures to safeguard the extrajurisdic-
tional environment. 479 If the United States loses a challenge, the winning
country will be able to impose trade sanctions against the United States
until Congress changes the law.48 0 The Administration recognizes this,
but it prefers to accentuate the positive. According to President Clinton,
the new GATT agreements "preserve the ability of the United States to
impose measures necessary to protect the health and safety of our citizens
and our environment .... -
48 1
That statement is debatable even in its geographically limited form.
Consider Venezuela's complaint against EPA's reformulated gasoline reg-
ulations (noted above).482 The Clean Air Act requires a reduction of ole-
fins in gasoline from 1995-1997.48s U.S. refiners are allowed to phase in
reductions from their own 1990 baselines, while foreign refiners, must use
the U.S. average baseline.484 This may violate GATr Article III (although
it might be argued that Venezuelan gasoline, which has three times the
amount of olefins, is not a "like" product), but a reasonable defepse could
be made by the United States under GATT Article XX.485 In early 1994,
Venezuela filed a complaint in the GATT.486 Instead of defending the
United States at the GATT, however, the Clinton Administration agreed to





479. Charnovitz, supra note 474, at 91.
480. Id.
481. Letter to Congressional Leaders on the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, 29 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 2601 (Dec. 15, 1993) (emphasis added).
482. See Clean Air and Venezuela, J. COM., Mar. 29, 1994, at 6A.
483. 42 U.S.C. § 7545(k) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
484. 59 Fed. Reg. 7716 (1994). An amendment was proposed on May 3, 1994. 59
Fed. Reg. 22,800 (1994).
485. See S. Res. 197, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., 140 CONG. REc. 3987 (1994).
486. See EPA Announces Fuel Plan for Venezuela; Threatened GATT Complaint Is Shelved,
INT'L TRADE REP., Mar. 30, 1994, at 504.
487. Id.
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This decision highlights several troubling aspects of the Clinton
Administration's policy on trade and environment. First, the decision will
mean dirtier air for the United States. EPA itself called it the "least envi-
ronmentally desirable outcome."4 88 Second, to limit the environmental
damage, the Administration got Venezuela to agree to a quota on gasoline
imports at the current level.489 Import quotas are a form of managed
trade and are almost always bad. 490 Third, the Administration worked out
the arrangement with Venezuela secretly without regard to normal U.S.
rule-making procedures.49 1 The episode gives credence to the complaints
of many environmentalists that GATT rules will shape environmental laws
in a secretive, anti-democratic way.
492
Although the SPS and TBT Uruguay Round agreements do tighten
the current GATT, their anti-environmental effects remain to be seen. But
it is clear that the Uruguay Round does nothing positive about the trade
and environment linkage. Unfortunately, the Clinton Administration is
trying to claim more: "The Uruguay Round marks a first step toward rec-
ognizing the interdependence of economic and environmental goals in
world trade rules. The preamble to the new World Trade Organization
establishes sustainable development as a goal and recommends a work
program to begin to deal with these issues."4 93 By relying upon a pream-
ble to demonstrate principles that are not present (and one can argue are
even thwarted) in the agreement itself, the Administration befogs public
debate. The Uruguay Round does not mark a first step. This tactic of
inferring progress from preambles (also followed by the Administration
with regard to the NAFTA) should be stopped. One way to do so would be
to eliminate preambles from trade agreements.
On the plus side, the Administration did secure GATT agreement on
a new trade and environment committee. 494 But a large amount of effort
had to be expended for a fairly minor goal. 495 One reason why the
United States found it so difficult to secure the new GATT trade and envi-
ronment committee is that the Clinton Administration has given credence
488. EPA to Change Clean Air Rule to Ward Off Threatened GATT Challenge, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Mar. 25, 1994, at 1, 13-14.
489. Id. The quota applies to dirty gasoline. Venezuela may send in additional gaso-
line if it meets average U.S. standards.
490. See generally DouoAs A. IRWIN, MANAGED TRADE: THE CASE AGAINST IMPORT
TARGETS (1994).
491. See Congress Questions Legality of Gasoline Compromise with Venezuela, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Apr. 1, 1994, at 9.
492. See Lori Wallach, Hidden Dangers of GATT and NAFTA, in THE CASE AGAINST FREE
TRADE, supra note 37, at 23. For a good discussion of the interaction of the GATr and
environmental measures, see Kurt C. Hofgard, Is this Land Really Our Land? Impacts of
Free Trade Agreements on U.S. Environmental Protectio 23 ENVIL L 635, 660 (1993).
493. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, supra note 20, at 9.
494. See TNC Decision on Trade and Environment, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Apr. 8, 1994, at S-
4.
495. The Clinton Administration claims that the Committee "will assist efforts to
reach international agreement on environmental issues that affect the entire world,
such as ozone depletion, global climate change, and biodiversity." See OFcE OF THE
U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIvE, supra note 20, at 19.
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to the view that the U.S. interest in trade and environment is as much
about maintaining competitiveness as it is about safeguarding the environ-
ment. For example, during the NAFTA debate, President Clinton sug-
gested that the side agreement would raise Mexico's production costs, and
that this outcome would be good for the United States. 49 6 U.S. Trade
Representative Mickey Kantor has explained that other countries must
meet tough U.S. pollution laws in order for U.S. companies to remain
competitive. 49 7 It is no wonder, therefore, that developing countries have
been doubtful of the Clinton Administration's motives for more environ-
mental work in the GATIT.
In addition, President Clinton announced the creation of a Trade
and Environment Policy Advisory Committee at the end of March 1994.498
Although a seemingly small step, this action is significant because the Bush
Administration had refused to do it,499 but President Clinton has failed to
convene the Committee during 1994.
Finally, another important missed opportunity should be noted. Dur-
ing the budget debate in 1993, the Clinton Administration sought to
impose a new "British Thermal Unit" (BTU) tax to conserve energy and
raise revenue. When concerns were raised about the effects on domestic
competitiveness, the Administration agreed to provide a border adjust-
ment for the tax. The border adjustments, as enacted by the House,500
were criticized as GATT-illegal by the European Commission.50 Eventu-
ally, the tax was dropped.
0 2
This episode was disappointing for many reasons. Had the Adminis-
tration tried to negotiate a common BTU or energy tax with the European
Commission, it might have been able to overcome the competitiveness
fears. The European Commission had put forward proposals for a carbon
tax but had predicated it on similar action in the United States and
Japan.50 3 Thus, effective leadership by the Clinton Administration at the
496. See Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session on the North American Free
Trade Agreement in New Orleans, Louisiana, 29 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1766 (Sept
15, 1993).
497. Bob Davis, U.S. Is Hoping to Blend Environmental, World Trade Issues at Morocco
Meeting, WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 1994, at A9; see also Hobart Rowen, New Trade Buzzword,
WAsH. Posr, Dec. 31, 1993, at A21 (Kantor says the United States must insist that its
trading partners follow the same environmental rules that we do.).
498. Executive Order 12905-Trade and Environmental Policy Committee, 30
WEEKLY COMP. PmuS. Doc. 639 (Mar. 25, 1994).
499. Conversation with Joshua Bolten, General Counsel of the U.S. Trade Represen-
tative (Spring, 1991).
500. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312
(1993).
501. See Letter from Ambassador Andreas van Agt to Majority Leader Richard
Gephardt (May 26, 1993) (on file with the Cornell International Law Journal); see also
Richard Lawrence, Proposed Energy Tax on Imports Stirs Debate on U.S. Trade Policy,J. COM.,
May 18, 1994, at 10A Karl D.Jackson, 'Green'Protectionisn, Clinton's Hidden Tariff, WALL
ST. J., May 25, 1993, at A10.
502. David S. Cloud et al., Deal on Deficit Sets Stage for Senate Floor Ftght 51 CONG. Q.
1542 (1993).
503. EsTy, supra note 4, at 174.
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right moment might have facilitated an energy tax.
Conclusion
The GATT has fairly narrow responsibilities. It does not govern interna-
tional trade. It does not regulate private behavior.50 4 Its role is to super-
vise governments in their use of trade restrictions and domestic subsidies.
With regard to any particular transaction crossing international bor-
ders, there are a lot of questions one might ask. This article noted twenty-
five questions and found that the GAT17 would be interested in only about
three. Environmentalists want to interest the GATT in more of these
questions.
Trade benefits participants; otherwise, they would not do it. But one
can raise important questions about such mutually satisfying trade. For
example, would a particular trade have occurred if the prices had better
reflected social costs? Does trade engender production that has negative
externalities that exceed the utility added from the trade? Does society
want to use coercive power to prohibit certain trades, notwithstanding
their enjoyability (or perhaps because of this)?
One of the earliest trade theorists, Sir Dudley North, once wrote
"[t] hat there can be no Trade unprofitable to the Publick; for if any prove
so, men leave it off; and whereever the Traders thrive, the Publick, of
which they are a part, thrives also."50 5 North's insight is a keen one, par-
ticularly for the seventeenth century. But a profitable trade among indi-
viduals does not necessarily lead to a more thriving public. Because of
indirect scale or structural effects of trade, such thriving could be more
apparent than real.
Yet the fact that trade can have negative social effects is not a strong
argument for inhibiting trade. Many (and perhaps even more) of these
negative social effects will occur following domestic production and
domestic commerce. Thus, while Sir Dudley was basically right, the story
is a bit more complex than as he explained it.
President Clinton has suggested the need for new institutional
arrangements to ensure that trade leaves the world cleaner than before.
The current institutional arrangement is the GATT (soon to be the WTO),
which supervises the trade restrictions imposed by governments. If the
GATr is very successful at its mission, then it might make customs stations
cleaner, since no one will use them. But the GATT has no rules regulating
private behavior, nor does it supervise the regulation of production prac-
tices by governments. So the GATT is two steps removed from the market
decisions being made every moment that dirty (or cleanse) the world.
The use of trade measures for environmental purposes has been
sharply criticized in recent years by the GATT Secretariat and many GATT
504. But Article VI suggests that injurious dumping is to be condemned. See GATT,
supra note 1, art. VI.
505. DUDLEY NORTH, DIscouRsEs UPON TRADE 13 (Jacob B. Hollander ed., 1907)
(1691).
Vol 27
1994 Free Trade, Fair Trade, Green Trade
members. This practice has been decried as extrajurisdictional, eco-impe-
rialist, protectionist, and unilateralist.
The charge of extrajurisdictionality is warranted. The trade measures
in question have cosmopolitan objectives. They see the world environ-
ment as an ecosystem that does not stop at political boundaries.
The charge of eco-imperialism is unjustified. Imposing product stan-
dards or banning imports is not coercion. It is not an effort to make other
countries dependent Of course, environmental trade measures may seek
to influence the actions of other countries, but there is nothing wrong
with that. Indeed, it is virtuous for a nation to help others avoid its own
mistakes.
The charge of protectionism is also unjustified. Environmentalists
want to "protect" human health, but that is not the same thing as protec-
tionism, which is a policy to prevent imports in order to preserve domestic
production. It is not the fault of the environmentalists that "protection-
ism" has such a negative connotation within the trade community. Still,
they would be wiser to select a different word. Environmentalists should
also stop borrowing trade jargon, such as "eco-dumping" and "green 301,"
in the hopes of showing how their goals fit into trade policy frameworks.
The charge of unilateralism is also unjustified. Indeed, of all these
charges, it is the most inapposite. It is true that many environmental trade
measures are unilateral. But the actions that necessitate such measures
are also unilateral. When governments pollute the global commons, when
governments declare that their right to export products (e.g., dolphin-
unsafe tuna) must not be questioned, when governments dodge intergov-
ernmental conservation efforts by asserting a right not to participate, when
governments deny that beggar-thy-environment practices can lead to
unfair trade, or when governments rely upon outdated concepts of sover-
eignty, then such governments deserve blame for the continuing intracta-
bility of global environmental problems. They are the true unilateralists.

